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BULLIES, WORDS, AND WOUNDS: ONE STATE'S
APPROACH IN CONTROLLING AGGRESSIVE
EXPRESSION BETWEEN CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
Many adults seem to perceive confrontations with the bully in the
school yard as a staple ingredient of any "normal" childhood. It is
such a perception, though, that creates the societal myths underesti-
mating the damage that bullying behavior inflicts upon its partici-
pants. Studies are now showing the severe, and lifelong, consequences
this behavior can have on both the victimized child and the bully.'
Bullying comes in all forms and the "players" of this game are of all
ages, shapes, and sizes. This behavior can range from verbal aggres-
sion (name-calling, teasing, and taunting) to physical confrontations
(pinching, hitting, kicking) and may escalate into aggressive, physical
attacks or even death. Although verbal aggression may lack an imme-
diate physical harm, constant verbal attacks may wound the victimized
child just as severely as a punch or a kick.2
As some states and communities begin to comprehend the devastat-
ing and long-term effects bullying has on children, new questions must
be addressed concerning this age-old problem: How should society
control verbal aggression? What is the most effective way to disci-
pline the bully while helping both the victim and bully overcome the
psychological barriers? What forum is best suited for the disciplinary
and psychological needs of the participants? These questions, and
many more addressed herein, demonstrate the complex issues impli-
cated in a seemingly simple problem.
One state, North Dakota, recently faced a situation that incorpo-
rated these questions with a twist: What role will the courts play when
1. See generally RICHARD J. HAZLER, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF VIOLENCE: INTERVENTIONS
FOR BULLYING AND VICTIMIZATION (1996) (discussing the future implications of bullying); DAN
OLWEUS, BULLYING AT SCHOOL: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE CAN Do (1993) (discussing
intervention techniques).
2. The scope of this Note is confined to "verbal or expressive aggression" between children.
This aggression is expression in the form of name-calling, teasing, taunting, threats, and any type
of written, verbal, facial, or artistic expression used to humiliate, harass, or ostracize another
child. Although the author is aware that most bullying behavior involves mixed aspects of verbal
and physical conduct, her analysis has been purposely restricted to expressive behavior. This
limitation more vividly illustrates the tough issues implicated by Svedberg v. Stamness, 525
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994), since the conduct at issue was purely expressive.
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the parents, schools, and community have allegedly failed to control a
bullying situation? The North Dakota Supreme Court decided that a
legal solution was appropriate to "stop" one child from bullying an-
other in its decision Svedberg v. Stamness.3 This case arose from a
situation that included years of verbal bullying where the victim and
his parents were unable to receive satisfactory relief from the school
and community. 4 The North Dakota Supreme Court permitted the
victimized child to seek shelter from his bully under one of its anti-
stalking laws. 5 Because the bullying behavior involved in this case was
verbal, or expressive, behavior, much of the court's focus was on the
bully's First Amendment defense to the stalking claim. 6
Part I of this Note will address the major issues raised by Svedberg
v. Stamness. This section will address the First Amendment and the
judicially created "fighting words" doctrine, with an additional explo-
ration of the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of that
doctrine prior to its decision in Svedberg v. Stamness.7 In addition,
stalking laws, in particular the laws in North Dakota, are discussed to
provide the background behind this court's "legal solution."' 8 Part I
concludes with a brief look at the rights of children and an exploration
of this childhood phenomenon called "bullying." 9
Part II focuses on the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in
Svedberg v. Stamness, with an analysis of the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions. Part III evaluates the issues presented by the
North Dakota case, and Part IV stresses the national impact this
"legal solution" may have on the broader issues implicated by this
decision. This Note identifies the major issue raised by this case:
Where is the best forum for remedying bullying situations? The au-
thor argues that aggressive and verbal expression between children
should be seriously monitored and controlled by parents, schools, and
communities with effective and constructive discipline and psychologi-
cal help for both the bully and his target. Only the local-level forum
can effectively stop this behavior by giving its children the skills to live
and communicate in today's world. Therefore, the author concludes
that the legal remedy administered by the courts cannot serve such
valuable functions and should only be utilized as a last resort to ad-
minister some relief where a community has failed its children.
3. 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994).
4. Id. at 685.
5. Id. at 684.
6. Id. at 682-84.
7. See infra notes 10-107 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 124-283 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
This section explores the issues involved in the Svedberg case and
the broader implications of the decision. Part A represents the discus-
sion of the First Amendment fighting words doctrine. This is a key
section since the majority opinion of the Svedberg case relies so heav-
ily on the fighting words doctrine to prohibit the boy's speech and
expression. Issues explored in this section consist of general First
Amendment theories and judicial methodology, a tracing of the fight-
ing words doctrine and a conclusion with scholarly analysis and criti-
cism of the modern doctrine. Part B specifically looks at the North
Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of the fighting words doctrine
prior to its decision in Svedberg. This section continues with Part C,
which explores the stalking statute used to prohibit the bully's behav-
ior. It includes a brief discussion of the statute, the legislative history,
and anti-stalking legislation in general. This section concludes with an
extensive look at speech and children. Part D looks into the signifi-
cant legal history of the First Amendment and children, the empirical
evidence of the children's development of rationality, the right and
duty of the public schools to discipline children, and a close examina-
tion of bullying behavior.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment
Fighting Words Doctrine
Freedom of speech has been described as a "cornerstone" of the
United States system of democratic government.10 The First Amend-
ment provides a vehicle for all citizens to voice opinions, grievances,
thoughts, and expression.'1 The protections afforded to citizens by the
First Amendment are seen as both an extension of liberty and an ac-
ceptance of the consequences of such liberty.12 Theories supporting
10. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WoRDs 3 (1995) (noting the important role freedom
of expression plays in a democracy). For example, by studying the relationships between citi-
zens, government, and its branches, Greenawalt finds that the manner in which a judiciary and a
legislature govern this freedom reveals information about the relationship between them. Id. at
3-10.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.").
12. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1322
(1992) (suggesting that the cost of a strong First Amendment is a "legal toleration of speech-
related harm" which is "the currency with which we as a society pay for First Amendment
protection").
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the First Amendment help trace the scope of free speech in modem
times. 13
Theories of free speech can be divided into separate categories, de-
pending on the focus of analysis. 14 For example, free speech princi-
ples can be supported by utilitarian goals and nonutilitarian, or
individual, purposes.15 Some frequently cited utilitarian theories sup-
port speech which facilitates the political process,16 seeks truth,17 and
serves as a check on abuse by public officials. 18 A classic nonu-
tilitarian theory supports speech which contributes to the pursuit of
self-fulfillment, autonomy, and individual liberty.19 Although the var-
13. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 12-27
(1989) (exploring the numerous justifications for free speech and concluding that no one justifi-
cation can support the First Amendment on its own).
14. Some scholars contend that there is a single justification for free speech under a First
Amendment analysis. Of course, most of these scholars do not agree on what that justification
is. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1-86 (1984)
(describing the justification as individual self-realization); see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 991 (1978) (asserting key justifica-
tions for free speech as individual participation in political change and individual self-fulfill-
ment); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
25-26 (1971) (finding a political principle of free speech as most relevant to the function of
speech). But see Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989)
(addressing the need to consider many justifications in order to adequately interpret the First
Amendment protections).
15. See GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 14-34 (preferring to categorize speech justifications as
"consequentialist" and "nonconsequentialist"). Greenawalt describes the consequentialist's rea-
soning as favoring speech if it "contributes to some desirable state of affairs." Id. at 14. This
approach looks to the end result of speech, whereas the "nonconsequentialist" line of reasoning
does not look to the consequences of specific practices of speech. Id. Nonconsequentialist rea-
soning focuses on individual rights to speak, or not to speak, rather than on the results (such as
whether speech contributes to the political process). Id. Greenawalt gives a few "notable" ex-
amples of the nonconsequentialist line of reasoning as supporting "present rights or claims of
justice." Id.
16. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[F]reedom
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth .... ).
17. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice
Holmes' famous "marketplace of ideas" is an often-cited rationale to protect speech: "[T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market and ... truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out." Id. But see GREENAWALT,
supra note 10, at 34 (criticizing the "marketplace of ideas approach" as a "mistaken or incom-
plete argument for free speech" because it must rest on other premises not articulated in the
test).
18. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
521, 542 (1977) (arguing that "the role of the ordinary citizen is not so much to contribute on a
continuing basis to the formation of public policy as to retain a veto power to be employed when
the decisions of officials pass certain bounds").
19. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (stating that
"freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment"); see also
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ious theories are a constant source of intellectual debate and discus-
sion, the underlying basis of each realize a distinct value in protecting
speech and expression.20
The judicial approach, or methodology, of analyzing the scope of
free speech protections is most frequently classified into three catego-
ries.2' First, the absolutist approach takes a literal interpretation of
the language in the First Amendment and prohibits any restriction on
speech.2 2 Second, the balancing approach weighs the government in-
terest in prohibiting speech against the speech interest.23 Third, the
categorical approach carves out specific categories of speech and ex-
pression which do not receive First Amendment protection.2 4 The
theory behind this approach is the establishment of bright-line rules,
which automatically exclude certain expression from First Amend-
ment protection and which may be regulated by the state.25 Because
categorization is responsible for the fighting words exception, analysis
of this approach will be further explored throughout this discussion.26
Although the fighting words doctrine was developed over fifty years
ago, it remains a largely undefined and misunderstood doctrine of
speech regulation. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire27 represents the
REDISH, supra note 14, at 11 (citing self-realization as the ultimate value protected by the First
Amendment).
20. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text (comparing the various asserted free speech
rationales).
21. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1004-07 (12th ed. 1991) (noting these
three themes as "recurrent ... in modem First Amendment adjudication").
22. Justice Black is the most noted advocate of the absolutist approach. See CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, in THE OCCASIONS OF
JUSTICE 89, 100-01 (1963) (discussing Justice Black's absolutist approach and the recognition that
balancing plays even in this approach). Although Justice Black strictly interpreted the language
"Congress shall make no law" to strike down any laws limiting speech, his definition of what
constituted speech was very narrow. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting) (finding flag burning properly prohibited "conduct" rather than protected
expression). Justice Black found flag burning to be wholly outside the purview of First Amend-
ment protection. Id.
23. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (providing an example of the Court's balanc-
ing process as applied to a First Amendment analysis). The Court in Cohen found the speaker's
heavy speech interest outweighed the state's asserted privacy interest. Id. at 23; see infra notes
61-65, 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing Cohen and its impact on the fighting words anal-
ysis); see also GUNTHER, supra note 21, at 1004-07 (criticizing the balancing approach as fre-
quently interpreted too subjectively and often left to judicial discretion).
24. The current categories of speech receiving less or no First Amendment protections are
defamation, fighting words, obscenity (including some varieties of "indecent" communication),
and commercial speech. See GUNTHER, supra note 21, at 1070 for a review of these categories.
25. See id. at 1007 (contending that the categorization approach has elements of both the
absolutist and balancing approaches).
26. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (introducing the fighting
words category).
27. Id.
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foundation of the fighting words doctrine. The defendant in Chaplin-
sky, a Jehovah's Witness, called the City Marshal a "goddamned rack-
eteer" and "a damned Fascist" before the Marshal and a crowd on a
city street. 28 The Court unanimously upheld the defendant's convic-
tion under the state's disorderly conduct statute.29 The Court catego-
rized fighting words as outside the protection of the First
Amendment.30 Fighting words were defined by the Court as "those
[words] which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace." 31 The Court went on to observe that
"such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality. ' 32 The Court found that New Hampshire's
statutory intent to maintain public peace was legitimate and that the
only words prohibited were those which had a "direct tendency" to
cause retaliation by the addressee.33 The Court further defined the
fighting words test as an objective measure of the reasonable response
of an "average addressee" to inflammatory words. 34 This decision es-
tablished not only a new, judicially created exception to the First
Amendment, it started a debate over its parameters which is currently
far from settled. 35
A few years later, the Court reaffirmed the fighting words category
in Terminiello v. Chicago36 but narrowed the doctrine's scope of cov-
28. Id. at 569-70.
29. Id. at 569, 574. The New Hampshire law at issue stated that "'[n]o person shall address
any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or
other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name."' Id. at 569 (quoting 378 N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 2).
30. Id. at 571-72. The court also listed obscenity, profanity, and libel as other unprotected
categories. Id.
31. Id. at 572; see Melody L. Hurdle, Note, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confu-
sion of the Fighting Words Doctrine, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1143, 1148-49 (1994) (discussing the two
definitions of fighting words); see also Michael J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words Doc-
trine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (1993) (tracing the 50-year evolution of the Chaplinsky fighting
words tests).
32. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
33. Id. at 573.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Hurdle, supra note 31, at 1147-54 (highlighting the scope of the debate which
continues over Chaplinsky's interpretation). Some scholars contend that the Court intended a
narrow holding. Id. at 1147.
36. 337 U.S. 1, 17-22 (1949) (convicting the defendant under a breach-of-the-peace statute for
calling a group of protesters "slimy scum," "snakes," and "atheistic, communistic Jew[s]" during
his speech).
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erage to specific situations which threatened incitement to violence. 37
This shift in emphasis required the Court to look to the context of
words-not just the content.38 Therefore, the Court concluded that
the fighting words doctrine only included speech which incited an im-
mediate retaliation and not those words which caused injury by
utterance. 39
In Feiner v. New York, 40 the Court upheld the defendant's disor-
derly conduct conviction based on his political speech during a street
rally.41 Based on its prior decision in Terminiello, the Court con-
cluded that the defendant was not convicted for the "making or con-
tent of his speech" but rather for "the reaction which it actually
engendered. '42 In other words, the speaker was arrested and con-
victed based on the audience's reaction to his speech, not for the
words alone.43
Shortly after the Feiner decision, the Court relied on the fighting
words doctrine in its development of other areas of unprotected
speech. For example, the Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois44 inter-
37. Id. at 5-6 (finding the state court's interpretation of its statute unconstitutionally over-
broad since it included punishment for speech which "stir[s] people to anger"). By excluding
language which only angered or disturbed the audience, the Court seemed to reject a per se
presumption of violence from specific words. Id. at 6. This standard is later emphasized in the
Court's decision in Cohen v. California. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text for a fur-
ther discussion of Cohen.
38. 337 U.S. at 46 (stating that a conviction based on content alone may not stand); see also
Hurdle, supra note 31, at 1150 (stating that "the Court considered the likelihood of an uncontrol-
lable reaction to be a factual inquiry that relies on the circumstances surrounding the use of the
language").
39. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (citing Chaplinsky for the principle that speech will be protected
unless it results in a clear and present danger of serious violence).
40. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). The defendant charged in this case made derogatory remarks about
President Truman, local politicians, and the American Legion during a rally. Id. at 317. The
police arrested Feiner for refusing to discontinue his speech after several crowd members ex-
pressed anger and created the potential for violence. Id.
41. Id. at 320-21. Although the Court did not analyze this case under the fighting words doc-
trine, the statute involved in this case parallels the statute interpreted in Chaplinsky. See Aviva
0. Wertheimer, Note, The First Amendment Distinction Between Conduct and Content: A Con-
ceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting Words Jurisprudence, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 793,
804 n.61 (1994) for a comparison of the two statutes.
42. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320.
43. But see id. at 325-27 (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting the idea that danger was imminent or
that the defendant was arrested solely because his speech had the tendency to cause violence).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black articulated his belief that the defendant was arrested
based on his race and the content of his speech. Id. at 328. According to Justice Black, the
police should have afforded the speaker protection from the angry listeners instead of arresting
him. Id. at 326-27.
44. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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preted an Illinois group libel statute under a fighting words analysis.45
The Court upheld an Illinois law which criminally prosecuted those
who published materials that portrayed a class of citizens as "lacking
virtue" or otherwise defamed a group of citizens. 46 The statute re-
ferred to libel as a proscribable category of speech and the Illinois
Supreme Court interpreted this category to include the words "liable
to cause violence and disorder. ' 47 The Court held that the defendant
was properly charged under the statute based on Illinois' desire to
prevent further racial violence and by the fact that these libelous ut-
terances fell outside of First Amendment protection.48
Not only did the Court "borrow" from the fighting words doctrine
for guidance in other areas of speech, it looked to and continues to
refer to other speech categories for assistance in interpreting the cur-
rent fighting words doctrine. For example, the Court's symbolic ex-
pression analysis in United States v. O'Brien49  has provided
implications for the fighting words inquiry.50 Symbolic expression is a
combination of nonverbal conduct and expressive activity performed
to communicate an idea or stance on an issue.5 1 The utility of the
symbolic expression construct in the fighting words analysis lies be-
hind the Court's treatment of conduct and expression. 52
The Court's landmark decision in Brandenberg v. Ohio53 in 1969
also has relevance to the fighting words doctrine.54 The Court inter-
preted the statute then at issue under the imminent lawless action doc-
trine which applies to conduct instead of speech.55 Brandenberg still
remains relevant to the fighting words doctrine because both types of
45. At the time of this decision, libel of an individual was independently proscribable; so, the
Court concluded that libel of a group was also prohibited. Id. at 254-56. Because these words
were outside the coverage of the First Amendment, the Court did not go on to consider whether
the words at issue would result in a clear and present danger (a requisite element under a fight-
ing words analy-'s).
46. Id. at 251.
47. Id. at 254.
48. Id. at 256-61.
49. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding the defendant's conviction under a 1965 statute prohibiting
destruction of a draft card).
50. See Wertheimer, supra note 41, at 807 n.78 (expressing the relevance of O'Brien to fighting
words cases as "a useful test for determining when conduct combined with speech may neverthe-
less be punishable despite the incidental infringement on the right of free speech").
51. GUNTHER, supra note 21, at 1217-18.
52. See Wertheimer, supra note 41, at 837 (asserting that the Court has essentially been apply-
ing elements of the O'Brien test in its fighting words approach since the "birth" of the doctrine
in Chaplinsky).
53. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
54. See id. (reversing the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member for advocating violence at a
rally).
55. Id. at 447-49.
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cases involve speech which tends to rouse listeners to anger or
unrest.56
The Court continued to define the fighting words doctrine in Street
v. New York. 57 In that case, the Court reversed the defendant's mali-
cious misdemeanor conviction for publicly defacing an American flag
and expressing his political beliefs. 58 The Court could not determine
whether the defendant was convicted for his words or his conduct.59
Because the Court found that the defendant's words were not spoken
to incite a violent response by any specific individual, it reversed his
conviction.60
Cohen v. California61 also represents an important Supreme Court
decision in First Amendment jurisprudence and in the development of
the fighting words doctrine. In this case, the Court reversed the de-
fendant's disorderly conduct conviction for walking around a Califor-
nia courthouse with "Fuck the Draft" written on the back of his
coat.62 The procedural history of Cohen revealed that the California
Court of Appeals appeared to rely on Chaplinsky's "very utterance
causes injury" test to convict the defendant, although it purported to
convict on a "reaction to violence" theory.63 The Supreme Court,
however, did not reach the California court's interpretation since it
found that Chaplinsky did not apply to messages, like the defendant's,
which were not directed to a specific individual or an "actual ad-
dressee.'64 The majority found that the defendant's words constituted
a political statement and more specifically that the "emotive function"
56. See Mannheimer, supra note 31, at 1549-57 (discussing the similarities between the fight-
ing words doctrine and the clear and present danger test articulated in Brandenberg); see also
Wertheimer, supra note 41, at 808 n.89 (finding the only difference between the two doctrines to
consist of the "make-up of the audience to whom the speaker is addressing his or her remarks").
Thus, the audience in a fighting words case is hostile to the speaker while the audience in a case
like Brandenberg is considered friendly, or supportive of the speaker. Wertheimer, supra note
41, at 808.
57. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
58. Id. at 578-79. The defendant burned an American flag and stated, "[wle don't need no
damn flag," in reaction to the shooting of a civil rights leader. Id.
59. Id. at 588-90.
60. Id. at 592, 594; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (determining that burn-
ing an American flag did not amount to fighting words because the expression did not insult a
specific individual or invite a violent reaction).
61. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 17. California further argued that the offensive word the defendant displayed should
be excised from public discourse. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, refusing to label
specific words as per se unprotected. Id. at 25-26.
64. Id. at 20 (finding that "[n]o individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably
have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult").
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of the defendant's words may have been the more important element
of the message. 65
In the term following Cohen, the Court used its "actual addressee"
standard and further narrowed the "reaction to violence" test (also
known as the incitement-to-violence test) in Gooding v. Wilson.66 The
defendant was charged under a Georgia statute for threatening sev-
eral police officers and using vulgar language during an anti-war pro-
test.67 The Court reversed the defendant's conviction based on the
statute's overbroad nature and the unlikelihood that a specific officer
would react violently.68
First Amendment scholar Kent Greenawalt has noted that Cohen
and Gooding represent two major developments since Chaplinsky.69
Professor Greenawalt stresses that Cohen represents the protection
for emotive function of words and that since the Cohen decision, "not
all remarks that amount to fighting words could be simply dismissed
as lacking any expressive value. ' 70 Gooding, according to Professor
Greenawalt, is one of a series of cases which has the importance of
reaffirming Cohen by striking down statutes aimed at offensive
speech. 71 Professor Greenawalt adds that in these cases "[t]he Court
emphasized the lack of danger of immediate violence. '72
The most recent Supreme Court decision interpreting the fighting
words doctrine was the 1992 decision of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paup3 in
which a teen defendant was charged with disorderly conduct under St.
Paul's Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance 74 for allegedly burning a cross
on the lawn of an African-American family. The Court unanimously
65. Id. at 26. The dissenting justices, on the other hand, would have categorized the defend-
ant's expression as fighting words not deserving of protection. Id. at 27-28. Justice Blackmun
described Cohen's conduct as an "absurd ... antic," falling outside the coverage of the First
Amendment. Id. at 27.
66. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
67. Id. at 519-20 n.1. The Georgia statute prosecuted "[a]ny person who shall, without provo-
cation, use ... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace
.... .Id. at 519. However, the Court found that "opprobrious" and "abusive" words were not
considered fighting words. Id. at 524-25. This interpretation seems to be a further rejection of
Chaplinsky's "injury by utterance" prong.
68. Id. at 528; see Hurdle, supra note 31, at 1153 (interpreting the court's language in Gooding
as further narrowing the standard "by requiring proof that the specific individual addressed
would be likely to react in an immediate, violent manner"); see also Gooding, 405 U.S. at 537
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority was only "paying lip service to
Chaplinsky").
69. GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 51.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
74. ST. PAUL, MINN. LEOis. CODE § 292.02 (1990). Section 292.02 provides:
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agreed that the ordinance on its face violated the First Amendment
but was split on the proper rationale.75 The majority, headed by Jus-
tice Scalia, accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of
the ordinance to only apply to fighting words which, by definition,
could be subject to punishment.76 Although the majority assumed the
continued vitality of the fighting words doctrine under Chaplinsky, it
held that even fighting words may not be regulated in a content-based
manner.77 The majority applied a strict scrutiny test despite the argu-
able "low value" of this type of expression. 78 The majority concluded
that the only solution to "save" this type of ordinance would be a
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characteri-
zation or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
In its interpretation of this ordinance, the Minnesota Supreme Court narrowed the ordinance
to "fighting words" to avoid an overbroad interpretation of the statute's language, particularly
the phrase, "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others." R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391. Even
though the state supreme court attempted to narrow the focus, the Supreme Court still found it
unconstitutional. Id.
75. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391; see Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amend-
ments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992) (reviewing the case facts and
the various positions); see also Hurdle, supra note 31, at 1146 ("The Supreme Court unanimously
ruled the ordinance unconstitutional, yet the majority and concurring Justices' opinions contrast
dramatically and contain inconsistent, infeasible approaches to the fighting words exception.").
76. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
77. Id. at 383-91. The rule of the majority, and of current First Amendment case law and
doctrine, presumes the invalidity of content-based restrictions. Id. at 382. In its opinion, the
majority highlighted two exceptions to the content-based rule: the criminalization of threats
against the President and regulations which have secondary effects on speech. Id. at 388-89. The
Court has applied the secondary-effect exception to obscenity cases. See Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring); see also Hurdle, supra note 31, at 1158 (analyzing the R.A.V. Court's
assessment of the protected elements of fighting words). "According to the majority [in R.A. V.],
fighting words are void of constitutional protection because the mode of the expression-the
'nonspeech' element of communication-is unprotected, yet the content of fighting words is
safeguarded under the First Amendment." Hurdle, supra note 31, at 1158.
78. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395-96. The majority's application of the strict scrutiny test to this
"hate speech" is significant because it is also the test invoked for the most protected forms of
expression-for example, political expression. The Court will normally accord deference to the
laws of states or other branches of the federal government as long as such legislation does not
violate constitutional principles or, as in the case of state laws, conflict with federal laws. DAVID
MOSI-IMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A PSYCHOLEGAL ANALYSIS
9 (1989). "When it appears that the government has acted in violation of the Constitution," this
judicial deference to the states or other branches of government "is replaced by strict scrutiny of
the government's motives and the consequences of its actions." Id.
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regulation of all fighting words instead of prohibiting only "unfavora-
ble" fighting words.79
The majority went beyond its content-distinction analysis to further
conclude that the practical effects of this type of statute also resulted
in viewpoint discrimination.80 Justice Scalia suggested that by restrict-
ing only certain fighting words, some speakers would be restrained by
law from certain expression while an opponent may be able to engage
in whatever expression she likes.8'
While the majority struck down the St. Paul ordinance based on the
city's underinclusive error, the concurrence found the unconstitution-
ality of the ordinance rooted in the overbroad danger of prohibiting
protected words.8 2 The concurring opinion, written by Justice White,
addressed the concern that the ordinance reached beyond fighting
words to include words that caused hurt feelings, offense, or resent-
ment.8 3 Justice White criticized the majority's adherence to the strict
scrutiny standard when the content distinctions involved such low-
value speech.s4
Since the Court's decision in R.A. V., there has been an outpouring
of scholarly commentary, debate, and criticism of the Court's posi-
tions and the current fighting words doctrine.8 5 In fact, even before
the R.A. V. decision, there were several scholars who maintained that
the fighting words doctrine was essentially dead.8 6 The continued vi-
tality of the fighting words doctrine has not been without criticism of
its various elements. For example, many criticize the doctrine's focus
79. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 ("[G]overnment may not regulate [speech] based on hostility-or
favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed.").
80. Id. at 391.
81. Id. at 391-92 (contending that a city has no "authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry Rules").
82. Id. at 411. Even though the Minnesota Supreme Court narrowed the statute to fighting
words, the concurrence believed that Minnesota still did not correct the overbreadth problem.
Justice White asserted that the ordinance was still silent on which "injuries" would sustain a
conviction. Id. at 413 (White, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 403.
85. See GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 55 (commenting that the R.A.V. decision "reveals
much about the present state of First Amendment adjudication in the [U.S.]"). Greenawalt goes
on to emphasize that the Court's position on content discrimination plays a major role in most
speech cases. Id. at 60-61.
86. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the majority's decision merely paid "lip service" to Chaplinsky and the doctrine it represented);
Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 536 (1980) (asserting
that a fighting words doctrine has no place in a democratic society); Thomas F. Shea, "Don't
Bother To Smile When You Call Me That"-Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky.
L.J. 1, 1-2 (1975) (arguing that fighting words should be a protected form of speech).
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on the likelihood of violent reaction by the addressee.87 Some have
recommended that the test focus on the response of all the listeners
instead of exclusively on the individual addressee. 88 Another criticism
of the doctrine involves the risk of government power to censor un-
popular expression. 89 The doctrine also has immense implications on
hate speech codes on college campuses and other educational are-
nas.90 In fact, Professor Greenawalt predicts that the impact of
R.A.V. will preclude the future possibility of any expansive law regu-
lating hate speech.91 The variety of discussions on the impact of
R.A.V. and the future of the fighting words doctrine provide helpful
guidance as to the appropriate regulation of speech and insults.92
B. North Dakota's Fighting Words Doctrine
One year before the R.A.V. decision was handed down, the North
Dakota Supreme Court issued an opinion with its interpretation of the
fighting words doctrine. The defendant in City of Bismarck v. Schop-
pert93 challenged his conviction under the city's disorderly conduct or-
87. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS
L. REV. 287, 297 (1990) (asserting that the likelihood of a violent reaction should not be relevant
in determining whether words are fighting words); Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 453-55 (noting that the victims of
hate-speech are more likely to suppress or disguise their rage than fight back).
88. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 53 (recommending that the fighting words test
"should be whether remarks of that sort in that context would cause many listeners to respond
forcibly").
89. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 474 (1985) (asserting a fear of mechanistic values imposed by officials).
90. See Richard D. Bernstein, Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words In-
tended To Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1757 (1985) (asserting that
the Court's increasing tolerance for profanity and insults have changed its perspective of the
First Amendment); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (upholding Wisconsin's
penalty enhancement statute for bias motivated crimes); GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 71-98
(addressing campus and workplace speech); Lawrence, supra note 87 (discussing speech codes
on college campuses).
91. GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 47-70. Professor Greenawalt discusses insults and epi-
thets and the harms created by such expression. He outlines four of the more common justifica-
tions for prohibiting insults and epithets: "(1) the danger of immediate violence; (2)
psychological hurt for persons who are the object of abuse; (3) general offense that such lan-
guage is used; and (4) destructive long-term effects from attitudes reinforced by abusive re-
marks." Id. at 50. Professor Greenawalt asserts that there is very limited expressive value in
speech that is intended to wound the addressee and embarrass him or her in a humiliating way.
Id. at 53. He concludes that the majority's approach in R.A.V. was too harsh. Id. at 55-58.
92. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for the scholarly debate and positions.
93. 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1991). In this case, the defendant approached a parked police car
in which a female police officer and a volunteer police chaplain were sitting. Id. at 809. As the
defendant walked by, he gave the police officer "the finger" and said, "Fucking, bitching cop."
Id. He kept walking while the police officer attempted to talk to him through the car window.
Id. He said, "Fuck you," three more times in response to the officer's questions. Id. The police
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dinance. 94 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction because his words were protected and, there-
fore, not proscribable based on the fighting words exception.95 The
court reviewed the challenged "inflicts injury by utterance" test and
the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of this focus. 96 It noted that
although the challenged language of the statute was from the original
Chaplinsky test, the U.S. Supreme Court "has never given [that lan-
guage] independent substance or a life of its own and has never...
held [it] to be, by itself, a valid basis for a criminal conviction. '97 It
further interpreted Chaplinsky to mean "that a state may limit speech
in order to prevent breaches of the peace but only that speech that is
'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause
a breach of the peace."' 98
The North Dakota Supreme Court continued its analysis by review-
ing the Terminiello and Gooding decisions. 99 It concluded that these
two decisions stood for the proposition that a state may not criminal-
ize words simply because they are vulgar and offensive.'00 The court
went on to define fighting words with language from the Cohen deci-
sion. 1 1 The court concluded its review with a discussion of City of
officer got out of the car and attempted to confront him. Id. As she was joined by her supervi-
sor, the defendant used more profanity. Id. As a result of these exchanges, he was arrested. Id.
94. The court cited Bismarck, N.D. Ordinance 6-05-01. This ordinance provides:
Disorderly Conduct. A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy,
or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person is
harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by his behavior, that person:
3. In a public place, uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture,
which language or gesture by its very utterance or gesture inflicts injury or tends to
incite an immediate breach of the peace ....
Id.
95. Id. at 813. The court accepted the defendant's contention that the jury convicted him
based on Chaplinsky's injury-by-utterance test instead of whether his words tended to incite an
immediate breach of peace. Id. at 810, 812. The court found that only the incitement to violence
standard met the constitutional requirements. Id. at 812. The defendant's conviction failed since
his "words were not a clear invitation to fight and the testimony did not demonstrate that these
words, spoken to this audience, had any tendency to cause an immediate breach of the peace."
Id. at 813.
96. Id. at 810-13. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court "edited the phrase 'inflict[s]
injury' from the Chaplinsky test." Id. at 811.
97. Id. at 810.
98. Id. at 811 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)).
99. See supra notes 36-39 and 66-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Terminello
and the Gooding decisions.
100. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 811.
101. Id. at 811-12 ("[F]ighting words are 'personally abusive epithets which, when addressed
to the ordinary citizen, are as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke
violent reaction."' (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
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Houston v. Hill'02 and Lewis v. City of New Orleans1°3 for their rele-
vance to the police-citizen encounter at issue. Both cases stand for the
proposition that police may not arrest someone for vulgar or offensive
speech unless there is a clear and immediate danger of a violent re-
sponse. 104 Although there is no police exception to fighting words,
the court noted that the circumstances in which the words are spoken
determine whether particular words are "fighting words.' 05 The
court concluded based on the police officers' testimony and the facts
of the encounter that the defendant's words "were not a clear invita-
tion to fight.' 0 6 Therefore, based on the review of U.S. Supreme
Court law, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the defendant's
conviction. 107
C. North Dakota's Stalking Laws
The North Dakota anti-stalking law criminalizes patterns of conduct
directed from one individual to a specific victim which "frightens, in-
timidates, or harasses that person.' 08 North Dakota also has a Disor-
derly Conduct Restraining Order statute,109 which gives broader
coverage for stalking protection. It prohibits conduct and speech
which are intended by the speaker to put the listener in fear or anxiety
for his or her safety, security, or privacy."10 The statute explicitly
states that constitutionally protected activity is not covered under this
102. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
103. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
104. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 811-12.
105. Id. at 813. The court noted that the officers' testimony revealed that the defendant's
words were not likely to incite them to violence. The court found this testimony supported the
notion that police may be thicker skinned since these officers "were able to hear Schoppert's
vulgar and abusive speech as part of their duties, divorce themselves from any anger ... and
concentrate on whether there was any danger that Schoppert might act violently." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1995). "No person may intentionally stalk an-
other person." Id. The North Dakota Legislature defines stalking:
"Stalk" means to engage in an intentional course of conduct directed at a specific per-
son which frightens, intimidates, or harasses that person, and that serves no legitimate
purpose. The course of conduct may be directed toward that person or a member of
that person's immediate family and must cause a reasonable person to experience fear,
intimidation, or harassment.
Id. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(c); see Tracy V. Kolb, Note, North Dakota's Stalking Law: Criminalizing the
Crime Before the Crime, 70 N.D. L. REv. 159 (reviewing North Dakota's stalking law as origi-
nally enacted in 1993).
109. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01; see infra note 296 (providing the complete text of
statute).
110. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01.
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provision.111 The penalty for violating the provisions of the re-
straining order can be up to a year of imprisonment, a fine of up to
one thousand dollars, or both.112
Minutes from the legislative discussion surrounding the enactment
of the Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order statute note that some
members wanted to provide stalking victims with another vehicle to
stop their stalkers. 13 There was a perceived need for this type of re-
straining order for women who could not use North Dakota's anti-
stalking law because there was no imminent threat of physical
harm.114 This statute also provides stalking victims more easily attain-
able protection from her stalker because it allows her to seek a civil
restraining order instead of waiting for enough evidence to satisfy the
requirements under the anti-stalking statute for a criminal
prosecution.1 5
In order to comprehend the North Dakota stalking laws at issue and
the types of speech that it may prohibit, it is useful to briefly review
stalking legislation and what constitutes stalking behavior. California
enacted the first stalking law in 1990 in response to the murder of
actress Rebecca Shaeffer and the murders of five other Orange
111. Id. § 12.1-31.2-01(5)(d). This provision offers the accused a defense to strike down the
restraining order issued against him.
112. Id. § 12.1-31.2-01(7)(b).
113. See N.D. Senate Jud. Comm. Minutes, H.B. 1238 (March 8, 1993) [hereinafter Minutes].
The testimony of Bonnie Palacek and James Vukelic reveal that the legislature considered the
importance of a civil restraining order as a quicker way for victims of stalking to stop their
harassers than through the stalking law.
114. See Minutes, supra note 113. Testimony of Ms. Bonnie Palacek explained the need for
another restraint besides North Dakota's stalking law:
Currently, only those with a history of physical abuse and who are in 'imminent threat
of physical harm' may petition the court for a Protection Order [N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02]. Although, in some parts of the state, this language has been stretched to
cover victims who don't have such a history, in other parts of the state they have no
protection at all.
For example, in the Fargo area, victims from Minnesota who are clients of the Rape
and Abuse Crisis Center have access to such Orders, but clients who live on the North
Dakota side of the river don't.
Id.
115. See Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 686 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., dissenting). The
dissent in Svedberg turned to the legislative history behind the Disorderly Conduct Restraining
Order statute to interpret the intended protections of this law. The dissent compared this stat-
ute's benefits for stalking victims in North Dakota to the protection under the stalking law alone:
The hope was that the option of a civil restraining order would obviate the need for
victims of stalking to rely on state's attorneys to initiate criminal prosecutions with the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt .... A civil restraining order would
be quicker, simpler, and accomplish the goal of protection from the intimidation and
fear caused by the stalker.
Id. (citations omitted).
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County women by their respective companions." 6 Early stalking laws
were very narrow and required that a stalker make a "credible threat"
with an intention to put his victim in reasonable fear for her life. 117
Legislatures across the country became aware of similar problems in
their own states and, soon thereafter, the flood of anti-stalking legisla-
tion began.118 Most states, including California and North Dakota,
have either broadened or implemented definitions of stalking behav-
ior to include situations where there is no direct threat of physical
violence.119
The tension between stalking behavior and the First Amendment
provides an interesting departure from any historical doctrine. Before
the First Amendment is implicated, the conduct must be expressive. 120
Most courts realize that stalking activity can be expressive. 121 In order
to provide protection for stalking victims, the courts must find a basis
to constitutionally prohibit the stalker's expressive behavior. Some of
the asserted rationales for prohibiting such expressive conduct include
likening the expression to fighting words or carving out a category of
unprotected speech, such as threats of harm.122 Whatever the ration-
ale, both the states and the courts have begun to accept stalking stat-
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1997) (setting forth California's stalking law);
see also Amy M. Sneirson, Note, No Place To Hide: Why State and Federal Enforcement of
Stalking Laws May Be the Best Way To Protect Abortion Providers, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 635, 652
(1995) (providing more background history suggesting why California was the first state to enact
a stalking statute).
117. See J. William David, Comment, Is Pennsylvania's Stalking Law Constitutional?, 56 U.
PIrt. L. REV. 205, 208 (1994) (noting that narrowness of these early laws put the victim at risk
because "they excluded much of the peculiar behavior that constitutes stalking, like leaving omi-
nous notes, or lying in wait near homes and offices").
118. Forty-seven states have enacted stalking laws. The states that have not (Arizona, Maine,
and New York) have amended their harassment statutes to target stalking activity. See Sneirson,
supra note 116, at 653.
119. Id. at 652; see also David, supra note 117, at 208-09 (describing stalking behavior). David
explains that such behavior comes in a variety of forms so many states have amended their anti-
stalking laws to cover more activity. The author also cites that seventy to eighty percent of
stalking victims know their stalker. David, supra note 117, at 207-08.
120. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (defining expressive conduct as
conduct that occurs when the speaker intends to convey a specific message and the addressee
will understand the message based on the surrounding circumstances); see also David, supra note
117, at 213 (discussing stalking behavior and expressive conduct).
121. See, e.g., Long v. Texas, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding its state's stalk-
ing statute void for vagueness due in part to the statute's threat to constitutionally protected
expression that may be a part of stalking conduct).
122. See GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 92-104 for an exploration of what types of threats,
not necessarily specific to the stalking situation, can be criminalized. Professor Greenawalt dis-
tinguishes between pure, unconditional threats and conditional threats. Id. at 90-92.
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utes as essential legislation by limiting First Amendment
implications. 123
D. Speech and Children: Background of the Law in the Classroom,
Children's Rights, and Bullying Behavior
Should the First Amendment apply to children as it does to adults?
Many commentators respond positively that, yes, children, like adults,
should be protected by the First Amendment. 124 In fact, the U.S.
Supreme Court declared that public school students were "constitu-
tional persons" in its landmark 1969 ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.125 Children's constitutional
status in the First Amendment arena implicates many issues.
1. Significant Legal History Regarding the First Amendment
and Children
Before focusing on the scope of children's First Amendment protec-
tions within the educational arena, it is important to step outside the
school environment and briefly examine the general constitutional
rights afforded to children. 26 In general, the U.S. Supreme Court has
determined that children receive less constitutional protection than
adults. 27 The Court's interpretation of children's rights presents a
tension between its paternalistic efforts to safeguard children and the
123. See supra note 118 as evidence of the nationwide acceptance of stalking legislation.
124. See, e.g., ROBERT W. LANE, BEYOND THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE, FREE SPEECH AND THE
INCULCATION OF VALUES (1995); DAVID MOSIHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A PSYCHOLEGAL ANALYSIS (1989) (representing a supportive approach for chil-
dren's speech rights).
125. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
126. See LANE, supra note 124, at 35 (exploring the general limits on children's constitutional
rights outside the education context to "illuminate the Court's rationale ... of First Amendment
protection for public school students").
127. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (establishing a standard providing less con-
stitutional protection for children). This case involved a state statute which prohibited children
under certain ages from selling newspapers and magazines in public places. Id. at 160-61. The
Court upheld this statute by finding the substantial state interest in protecting children was
stronger than the interest of the custodial figure (an aunt) who brought the suit. Id. at 166. The
Court concluded that because the government serves as a parental figure to safeguard children,
it may regulate children more than it can control the activities of adults. Id. at 168; see LANE,
supra note 124, at 36 (providing an overview of Prince). Lane noted that the Prince test required
the Court to "balance the individual rights involved against the state's authority to impose neces-
sary and reasonable restrictions in order to achieve some legitimate purpose." LANE, supra note
124, at 36-37; see also Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free
Speech Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
769, 781 (1995) (citing Prince as an example of the Supreme Court's position that "children,
simply by virtue of being children, are susceptible to dangers which adults do not risk and may
therefore deserve special solicitude from the law").
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liberty interest to guarantee individual interests and self-fulfillment. 128
Because of this tension, the Court attempts to strike a balance be-
tween providing no constitutional rights to children and providing
"coextensive" rights of both children and adults.129 One commentator
has noted that most of the Court's decisions concerning children's
constitutional rights have resulted in "modified constitutional rights"
for children. 130
The scope of children's First Amendment rights in the educational
arena has been debated and litigated frequently since the Tinker deci-
sion. The law and education have become strange partners. On the
one hand, the law has provided students with recognized rights.131 On
the other hand, the Court has recognized the school system's right to
exercise certain control over students. 132 A brief exploration of the
law and education since Tinker provides a framework of rights as
guaranteed to public school children. 133
The decision rendered in Tinker has been described as the "new era
in the protection of students' political expression in public schools,"'1 34
as "the leading authority on student rights of expression in public
schools,"'135 and as the acknowledgment of "the right of a child to
128. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) for an example of the Court's rejec-
tion of a state's paternalistic efforts to guide the upbringing of children. The Court struck down
Oregon's statute requiring children to attend public schools (as opposed to private or parochial
school). Id. at 534-35. The Court held that the state could not force children to a public educa-
tion: "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." Id. at 535. See LANE, supra note 124, at 35-42 for his analysis of the tension be-
tween what he terms "protection" and "autonomy." Lane explores this tension by looking at
children's rights in such areas as sexuality and due process. He notes that in sexuality decisions
involving minors, the Court prefers to limit children's autonomy and extend states' protection.
Lane observed a split in the due process cases with regards to child proxies in juvenile court
proceedings, but noted a stronger preference for more state protection. Lane concluded "we do
not find a comprehensive, consistent theory or pattern in the Court's decisions, although there
seems to be more weight assigned to protection, than to autonomy." Id. at 42.
129. LANE, supra note 124, at 35-36 (discussing the lower constitutional threshold for limiting
children's activities).
130. Id. at 44.
131. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (recogniz-
ing children's rights to expression as long as such expression does not result in a disturbance).
132. See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text for a discussion on school officials' ability
to control some student expression.
133. Since the Svedberg case does not involve speech regulation by the school, but rather by
the North Dakota Supreme Court, the following law and education analysis is limited. The in-
clusion of such materials becomes relevant in the analysis and will be examined further at that
point. For an overview of law and public schools, see LANE, supra note 124.
134. MARTHA M. MCCARTHY & NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 113
(2d ed. 1987).
135. WILLIAM VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLs 314 (2d ed. 1987).
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make claims to those rights and privileges heretofore denied him on
the basis of his status as a minor.' 36 Tinker involved a dispute be-
tween school authorities and students over the students' rights to wear
black arm bands to class as a form of protest to the Vietnam war.137
The Court ruled that the school did not have a secure basis for punish-
ing the students' political and symbolic expression. 138 The Tinker test
focused on whether the student expression "would 'materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school."1 39 If such expression does not inter-
fere, then the school's prohibition of the student's speech is not
justified. 14o
Building on the Tinker disruption standard, the Court recognized
other justifications for prohibiting certain student expression. In a
1986 decision, the Court allowed high school officials to "disassociate"
the school from a student's sexually explicit speech to the student
body at a school assembly by suspending him.141 The majority in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser held that Tinker did not pro-
tect disruptive expression or offensive speech and that the student's
expression was both.142 In rendering its decision, the Court noted the
important value of the school officials' action against the student to
show the school's disapproval of the subject matter. 43
The Court extended the new justification from Fraser and modified
the Tinker disruption test in its 1988 decision in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.'" A narrow margin of the Court found a high
school principal did not violate the First Amendment rights of journal-
ism students when he censored two of their student newspaper articles
136. Peter J. Sartorius, Social-Psychological Concepts and the Rights of Children, in SCHOOL-
ING AND THE RioHTs OF CHILDREN 64,67 (Vernon F. Haubrich & Michael W. Apple eds., 1975).
137. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (resulting in the suspension of three students for wearing the
armbands).
138. Id. at 509-11 (finding that school authority did not prohibit the wearing of all symbols; it
only targeted the particular expression the three students were projecting).
139. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). But see LANE, supra
note 124, at 113 (noting that the current test considers more than the Tinker disruption
standard).
140. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (finding that the "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression").
141. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (concerning a high school student
who gave a nominating speech at a school assembly that focused on a sexual metaphor).
142. Id. at 680.
143. Id. at 685-87 (stating that "it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself
to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with
the 'fundamental values' of public school education").
144. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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for publication. 145 The Court granted school officials the right to dis-
associate the school from student expression which may be inconsis-
tent with societal values, even if it means refusing to sponsor certain
expression.1 46 The articulated test allows school authorities to exer-
cise control over such student expression as found in a school newspa-
per if the school's "actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns."'1 47
The First Amendment standard as applied to public school students
includes an analysis of the content of the student's speech and its dis-
ruptive effect in order to determine consistency with educational val-
ues. Based on these standards, the Court has carved out other
categories of expression from First Amendment protection for student
speech-modeled after the First Amendment doctrine as applied to
adults.' 48 For example, the Court will not protect student expression
considered to be defamatory, 149 obscene or vulgar, 50 or inflam-
matory.' 5' These categories are more easily invoked in the public
school setting than for adults since the school authorities have a lower
constitutional threshold to satisfy than a state attempting to curb adult
expression.
145. Id. at 274 (justifying the principal's censorship of an article on teen pregnancy and an-
other article on the impact of divorce on students). The dissent, on the other hand, characterized
the principal's actions as that of "thought police." Id. at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 271-73 (noting that a school need not provide its resources to promote student
expression which school officials want to disassociate from school endorsement).
147. Id. at 273; see also MOS-IMAN, supra note 124, at 27 (discussing the contradictory ap-
proaches of Tinker and Hazelwood).
148. See MCCARTHY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra note 134, at 110 for a discussion of unpro-
tected student conduct and expression.
149. Id. at 110-11. For example, the Court looks to the status of the plaintiff, the context of
the statement, and the asserted expression to determine whether it was fact or opinion. Id. at
111.
150. Id. at 111-12 (noting the Supreme Court's approval of a sliding scale definition of obscen-
ity as applied to minors); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (per-
mitting a school to punish a student for a sexually explicit speech delivered at a school
assembly); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (setting forth the obscenity standard used to
evaluate materials intended for adults); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-337 (1968)
(upholding a state law prohibiting the sale of magazines containing nudity to children).
151. See MCCARTHY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra note 134, at 112 (equating inflammatory
expression to "fighting words"); see also Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972) (illus-
trating one court's approach to fighting words in the school environment); LANE, supra note 124,
at 113 (explaining an important limitation of the Tinker disruption standard as applied to inflam-
matory expression). Lane notes that "fighting words" may not result in apparent disruption in
the classroom since such behavior is often not observable to those in charge. "Fear, anger, re-
sentment, revulsion, or embarrassment may explain the veneer of passive acquiescence, making
student speech disruptive in ways not easily observable." LANE, supra note 124, at 113.
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2. Empirical Evidence on an Individual's Development
of Rationality
Although the Court has recognized public school students as "per-
sons" protected under the Constitution, it has often endorsed restric-
tion of student expression based on an assumption that the child has a
limited capacity to rationalize. 152 Since the emergence of First
Amendment rights in the classroom, the debate concerning the capac-
ities of children has factored into the freedom of expression analy-
sis. 153 David Moshman has explored the First Amendment
application to children through five components of constitutional
analysis. Moshman filters the First Amendment as applied to children
through the text of the First Amendment, 154 the original intent, 155
constitutional theory,156 precedent, 157 and values.' 58 Moshman con-
152. See MOSHMAN, supra note 124, at 25-32 (discussing the Court's reliance on "myths" or
generalizations about children to endorse school restrictions on expression).
153. Id. at 63-66 (analyzing and discussing current data on the development of rationality in
individuals); see also Paul C. Magnusson, Student Rights and the Misuse of Psychological Knowl-
edge, in SCHOOLING AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 92-114 (Vernon F. Haubrich & Michael W.
Apple eds., 1975) (citing the danger of "scientific" proof when school officials and courts use
such psychological data to further restrict children's rights).
154. See MOSHMAN, supra note 124, at 25 (finding no language in the text of the First Amend-
ment to support any distinction between adults and children).
155. Id. at 25-26 (pointing out that even though there is an argument that the framers were
only considering adults in drafting the Bill of Rights, the original intent argument in this context
has been rejected). For example, Moshman points out that it was once argued that the framers
only had "white males in mind" when drafting the Bill of Rights. Id. at 26. History has proven
that regardless of the First Amendment's original intent, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
all people equal protection, regardless of their gender or skin color. Moshman relates this obser-
vation to the change in the original relationship between the government and children through
the creation of public schools. Id.
156. Id. at 26-27 (rejecting the theory that the First Amendment stands solely for the protec-
tion of political speech and, therefore, only provides protection for voters to debate political
topics). Moshman responds to those who make this argument with his line of reasoning: "Even
if minors are not permitted to vote, their views may constitute a relevant contribution to political
debate." Id. at 27. Furthermore, Moshman points out that the courts have recognized that there
can be no "sharp line" between treatment of political and nonpolitical speech. Id.
157. Id. (describing First Amendment precedent as applied to children as "at best highly com-
plex and multifaceted and at worst mutually contradictory"). The contradiction is evident by the
approach taken in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969) and that of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Moshman ex-
plains the Hazelwood approach as taking the position that children are "fundamentally different
from adults." MOSHMAN, supra note 124, at 27. Tinker, on the other hand, represents the ap-
proach that the First Amendment law should apply to children "with due allowance for the
special characteristics of children where appropriate." Id. Moshman advocates the Tinker ap-
proach to guide future First Amendment applications to children. Id.
158. Id. at 27-29 (pointing to three values in support of recognized First Amendment rights for
children). First, Moshman recognizes the importance of "intellectual freedom" to "protect the
dignity of the rational individual." Id. at 28. Second, Moshman offers alternative support for
these values in the role to promote truth. Id. He recognizes the counter argument to the first
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cludes that even after the analysis of the five components, children's
rationality can often become an aspect of a First Amendment
inquiry. 159
Moshman highlights the importance of interpreting children's First
Amendment rights with empirical evidence regarding kids.160
Moshman suggests that although empirical evidence is never enough
to decide a constitutional issue, the Court should not exclude such
evidence or rely on myth or limited knowledge. 161 The key to
Moshman's analysis is his interpretation of the empirical evidence
showing support for the "Emergence of Rationality.' 162 His theory of
why and how the First Amendment applies to children is based on
social and behavioral science. 163 Moshman traces the "development
of rationality"' 64 in children in their deductive reasoning, inductive
reasoning, and moral reasoning to determine at what point a child
should receive full First Amendment protection.165
Deductive reasoning involves an understanding of a set of premises
and a conclusion drawn therefrom.' 66 Although there have been
many studies on deductive reasoning, Moshman admits that the de-
bate and controversy over the development of children's deductive
reasoning is lively and continues to remain unsettled in areas like pro-
gress and transition.1 67 Moshman defines four developmental stages
of deductive reasoning to map the gradual process of an individual's
two values as that which questions the rationality of children. Id. Moshman's response to this
attack is two fold: First, many older children and adolescents are as rational as adults. Id. Sec-
ond, these children need intellectual freedom in order to develop rationality. Id. The last value
Moshman suggests is the timeless societal value in the "autonomy and privacy of family." Id.
This value, although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, suggests the level of govern-
ment interference in children's expression in light of the strong parental role. Id. at 29.
159. Id. at 32-33.
160. Id. at 29 (suggesting that psychological research data will provide a basis for the ages of
development and rationality).
161. Id. at 30 ("It should be clear.., that neither the legal framework alone nor the psycho-
logical research alone can resolve the question of children's rights: each is necessary and neither
alone is sufficient.").
162. Id. at 62-91 (outlining several definitions of rationality and the pitfalls of a broad or
narrow definition).
163. Id. at 3.
164. Id. at 66.
165. Id. (recognizing that based on the evidence, there are some children, below a certain age,
who are obviously less rational than any normal adult and should have some restrictions on their
First Amendment rights).
166. Id. at 66-67.
167. Id. at 67.
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progress. These stages focus on content, 168 inference, 69 explicit
logic, 170 and explicit metalogic. 171 Moshman cautions that the ages of
individuals in each stage can differ substantially and because the de-
velopment is gradual, children may be in a transition between stages
rather than a true fit in one stage or another.172 Moshman concludes
that because most individuals reach the explicit logic stage in late
childhood or early adolescence and rarely reach the final stage, there
is very little distinguishing the level of deductive reasoning in adoles-
cence from that in adulthood. 173 Because deductive reasoning is a
narrow focus of reasoning, the analysis must also include inductive
reasoning.
Inductive reasoning involves "forming generalizations, dealing with
uncertainties and probabilities, testing hypotheses, and understanding
the nature of reality, knowledge, and the relation between these."'1 74
Again, Moshman explores the four stages of inductive reasoning de-
velopment: 1) focus on content, 175 2) awareness of subjectivity, 176 3)
explicit theory, 77 and 4) explicit metatheory. 178
168. Id. at 67-68. This first stage can be found in some preschool children especially if ration-
ality is defined as "simply ... a matter of correct inference, one could make a case that even five-
year-olds . . . are not qualitatively less rational than adults." Id. at 67. Moshman describes
young children as focusing on content rather than thinking about inference. Id. at 67-68.
169. Id. at 68-69. Most children in stage two are in their elementary school years. These
children can gain information through inference, rather than just from direct observation. Id.
170. Id. at 69-72. This third stage is usually reached by age eleven or twelve. Id. at 70. This
stage requires that the individual have the ability to distinguish "inferential validity" from "em-
pirical truth" and, therefore, are able to have "sufficient metalogical understanding to recognize
when a conclusion is logically necessary." Id. at 70. Moshman discusses several different experi-
ments to test this stage. Id. at 71-72.
171. Id. at 72. Moshman describes this final stage as requiring a "knowledge about the nature
of logical systems." Id. He notes that most individuals never reach this stage as children or
adults. Id.
172. Id. at 67.
173. Id. at 72-73.
174. Id. at 73.
175. Id. at 73-74. The evidence of the ability of young children to learn language suggests
inductive learning. Id. The typical Stage One child is a preschooler and, similar to Stage.One
deductive reasoning, the child will focus on the "content of the reasoning rather than the pro-
cess." Id. at 74.
176. Id. at 74-75. The children in Stage Two can separate their own knowledge from reality.
Id. at 74. In other words, these children can appreciate that others may differ in their ideas
about the same object or concept. Elementary school children are usually capable of recognizing
their own subjectivity and, therefore, fall into Stage TWo. Id. at 75.
177. Id. at 75-77. The Stage Three individual has a better understanding of theory and "its
relation to data." Id. at 75. The individuals in this stage, usually teens and adults, can concep-
tualize theories as an abstraction of possibilities rather than just concepts of reality. Id. at 76.
Moshman contends that most normal adults fall into Stage Three. Id. at 77.
178. Id. According to Moshman, and the research he relies on, Stage Four reasoning is not
found in many adults, even those with advanced education. Id. This stage involves a higher
1080
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The development of inductive reasoning in adults appears to be
comparative to the research in deductive reasoning.179 Again, most
individuals reach the third stage by focusing on inferences (in deduc-
tive reasoning) and explicit theory (in inductive reasoning) in early
adolescence, and most never reach the fourth metatheoretic stage. 180
The research and conclusions have led Moshman to decide that most
children over eleven years old can rationalize similarly to an adult. 181
The development of moral rationality is an important element of
Moshman's analysis because, as he points out, moral arguments are
often presented to limit First Amendment protections for children. 182
Although much evidence has suggested that children do have a con-
cept of morality, the importance of morality rests on an individual's
ability to understand his or her reasoning about moral situations, not
just his or her idea of what is right and wrong.183
The development of moral reasoning was traced through six stages
by Lawrence Kohlberg in 1984.184 The six stages represent increasing
levels of rationality in which individuals gradually progress and often
display reasoning from two, and often more, stages. 185 The stages,
heteronomous morality,186 individualism and exchange,187 mutual ex-
coordination of theory and data to further understand approaches to testing theories. Id.
Moshman describes the result as an "increasingly explicit philosophy of science." Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 77-78.
181. Id. at 78. Moshman concludes "[i]t is difficult to make a case that adolescents beyond the
age of about 11 are fundamentally less rational than the normal adult." Id.; see HERBERT P.
GINSBURG & SYLVIA OPPER, PIAGET'S THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 204 (3d ed.
1988) (noting that although Piaget found that young adolescents are able to distinguish their own
thoughts from the outside world, he also suggested that normal teens may not reach a stage of
logical thinking until between 15 and 20 years of age).
182. MOSHMAN, supra note 124, at 78. This argument to limit the First Amendment rests on
the paternalistic reasoning that children have little sense of morality and therefore must be shel-
tered from "morally wrong" material. Id.
183. Id. at 78-79. Moshman cites to the studies of Jean Piaget as the first to get beyond chil-
dren's conceptions of morality to explore the sophistication of their moral reasoning. Id.
184. Id. at 79 (citing 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NA-
TURE AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES (1984)). Moshman explains Kohlberg's theory to be
"[t]he most systematic effort to pursue this insight" into the development of moral reasoning. Id.
Kohlberg's theory was in part a reaction to the studies of Jean Piaget on the evolution of chil-
dren's morality. Id.
185. Id. at 79. Americans, as well as individuals from other cultures, appear to progress in-
variantly through the stages. Id.
186. Id. at 80 (describing a Stage One child as one who "perceives moral behavior as what
does not get punished").
187. Id. at 80 (cited as a stage predominant in elementary school children who recognize that
other individuals have interests which may be different from their own).
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pectations, 188 social system, 189 social contract, 190 and universal ethical
principles,191 serve to mark development of moral reasoning.
Although there is no comparative study to match Kohlberg's theory,
Moshman articulates the disagreements and criticisms, which the six
stages have endured. 192
The evidence from the available theories leads Moshman to con-
clude that although young children do understand moral concepts,
there is more of a basis to distinguish preschoolers and young children
from adults than there is a basis to differentiate adolescents from
adults. Therefore, Moshman notes the difficulty "to imagine a case in
which one could argue that adolescents as a group are sufficiently less
rational than adults in conceptualizing moral issues [and] that they
will be at a much greater risk than adults unless their First Amend-
ment rights are restricted."' 193
Environment has been proven to determine the development of ra-
tionality. 194 In fact, active participation in one's environment, as op-
posed to passive observance, and opportunities "to confront multiple
views"'195 are two critical factors for progression in learning and rea-
soning. 196 In other words, the more a child is exposed to different
views and perspectives while actively interacting with his or her envi-
188. Id. at 80-81. The third stage is common in American teens and adults. This stage in-
cludes such realizations as the importance of relationships with others, based on caring for
others. Id. "There is thus greater social rationality in the sense of a deeper appeal to and
reflection on moral reasons." Id. at 81.
189. Id. at 81 (describing Stage Four as an acceptance and understanding of morality based on
the abstractions of society, not just as an individual relationship). Morality at this stage is geared
towards one's societal or religious duties to "preserve the social structure." Id. This stage can be
found in teens and most American adults. Id.
190. Id. This stage can only be achieved by a small number of individuals. It "involves justifi-
cation of Stage Five reasoning on the basis of explicit ethical principles that form a formal moral
philosophy." Id. In order to achieve this stage, individuals must have an "intense experience in
ethical evaluation (e.g., some judges, theologians, and moral philosophers)." Id.
191. Id. at 81-82. This stage is not frequently found in normal individuals. Id. at 81. It in-
volves a "prior-to-society" consideration of utilitarian concepts to achieve an overall good while
preserving individual rights, a deontological concept. Id. at 81-82.
192. Id. at 83-85; see also Magnusson, supra note 153, at 102 (objecting to the reliance on
Kohlberg's theory because "[t]he notion of granting or denying rights and privileges solely on
the basis of competence-moral, cognitive, or even emotional-is objectionable when ... ex-
tended to adult society").
193. MOSHMAN, supra note 124, at 83.
194. Id. at 86. Moshman points out the error in the belief that development is "programmed"
and progress occurs according to a time clock. Id.; see GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 181, at
218-28 (noting Piaget's recognition that a child moves from one stage to the next, subject to the
child's interactions with his or her environment).
195. MOSHMAN, supra note 124, at 87.
196. Id. Moshman notes that facilitating this process is a crucial element in the role of educa-
tion. Id.
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ronment, the more quickly he or she can develop and grow intellectu-
ally.197 Therefore, Moshman's theory tends to support a child's
freedom to express and hear a variety of views since such a diverse
marketplace would contribute to his or her intellectual development.
Based on the empirical evidence from deductive, inductive, and
moral reasoning, Moshman responds to the argument used to limit the
First Amendment protection of children on a theory of their limited
rationality. 198 Moshman summarizes most theorists' cognitive devel-
opment conclusions as generally recognizing "the last major stage
transition as beginning no later than age 11 or 12 and see no general,
qualitative difference between the typical adolescent and the typical
adult."1 99 Based on this evidence Moshman suggests that children's
First Amendment rights be "restricted on the basis of limited rational-
ity"200 only if the government can show specific prevention of harm.20 1
3. The Right and Duty of Public Schools To Discipline Children
Although empirical evidence tends to prove equivalent levels of ra-
tionality in older children and adults, even theorists like Moshman
note the distinction between protected expression and disruptive
speech and conduct in the public school setting.202 In fact, as the U.S.
Supreme Court liberalized student expression in its important Tinker
decision, it also explicitly stated that discipline in the public schools is
the right and duty of school officials. 20 3 Therefore, a short exploration
of school discipline serves to highlight the proper scope and function
of controlling student expression and conduct.
Various forms of punishment are a standard method of discipline in
today's schools.204 The history of punishment is well established in
the development of discipline in the schools.205 A noted historian,
Carl Kaestle, traced the relationship of public schooling and punish-
197. Id.
198. Id. at 89-91. Other research comports with Moshman's general conclusion "that children
have substantial ability to make rational choices and that the decision-making of adolescents is
... rarely distinguishable from that of adults." Id. at 89.
199. Id. at 89.
200. Id. at 90.
201. Id. at 90-91.
202. Id. at 92.
203. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). The Court
stated that it has "repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
the states and of school officials, consistent with the fundamental constitutional safeguards, to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id.
204. See LANE, supra note 124, at 4-8 for a brief overview of discipline as a means of control-
ling students.
205. Id.
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ment to instill moral values to the early nineteenth century.2 06 Histor-
ical punishment was often severe in proportion to the pupil's
behavior.207 Punishment often "included flogging, shackling, humilia-
tion, and time in the portable pillory. '208 In contrast, today's punish-
ment usually includes the less physical punishment of suspensions,
expulsions, limited forms of academic sanctions, and reasonable cor-
poral punishment.209
Student discipline has been defined as "personal restraint" 210 which
must "have a rational, school-connected purpose and ... employ ra-
tional means to achieve the purposes to be served. ' 211 Thus, there
must be a harmful threat to the educational environment before the
school may discipline a student for undesirable behavior.212 This dis-
cipline must also be necessary for the proper operation of the school
and the educational process.213
The Court has even granted school officials the authority to disci-
pline students for conduct occurring off school grounds.214 Punish-
ment for such conduct "must be supported by evidence that the
student behavior outside school has a detrimental impact on the well-
being of the other pupils, teachers, or school activities. 2 15 School au-
thorities may not punish off-school activity if the conduct did not im-
pact the welfare of the school or the student lacked actual or
206. See Carl F. Kaestle, Social Change, Discipline, and the Common School in the Early Nine-
teenth Century America, J. INTERDISC. HilsT. 9 (1978).
207. LANE, supra note 124, at 10.
208. Id.
209. See MCCARTHY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra note 134, at 230-32 (noting the currently
acceptable and legal forms of punishment used to discipline students); see also LANE, supra note
124, at 6 (discussing a potential swing back towards more stringent discipline). Lane notes the
rising public concern about children's increasingly aggressive behavior towards authority and
one another. LANE, supra note 124, at 6. Lane notes that since the 1960s, public opinion polls
have shown a consistent concern over the effectiveness of school discipline. Id. Lane also men-
tions the 1984 federally sponsored report, A Nation at Risk, which concluded that the "dismal
state of public education" was a threat to a viable U.S. economy and the country's future ability
to compete in the global economy, Id. at 4.
210. VALENTE, supra note 135, at 313.
211. Id. (discussing students' substantive rights) (emphasis omitted).
212. Id.
213. See MCCARTHY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra note 134, at 231 for general guidelines
concerning student control.
214. See, e.g., Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (upholding school discipline
of a student who made an offensive comment at a local mall about a teacher to a group of
students); see VALENTE, supra note 135, at 313 (citing off-school assaults on other students and
drug sales to fellow students as reasonable grounds for school discipline); MCCARTHY & CAM-
BRON-MCCABE, supra note 134, at 203-04 (listing out-of-school fights, insulting remarks made to
teachers, and insulting remarks made about a teacher in a public place as conduct warranting in-
school discipline).
215. MCCARTHY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra note 134, at 203.
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constructive knowledge that such punishment would result from his
conduct. 216
New approaches to student discipline have been enacted in partial
response to the rising public concern about safety in the schools and in
partial response to the ineffectiveness of the old approaches to posi-
tively influencing student behavior.217 Educational scholars advocat-
ing fresh approaches stress the importance of student self-discipline,
the development of a school-wide plan, the variety of in-class strate-
gies, and the necessity of addressing the special needs of at-risk chil-
dren.218 The various approaches to student discipline are numerous
and yet there remains a difficulty for most educators to get a grip on
school behavioral problems.
The importance of classroom order to the proper functioning of ed-
ucating children remains paramount. The Court captured the essen-
tial role of educators in its assertion of the educational function: "The
primary duty of school officials and teachers ... is the education and
training of young people. A state has a compelling interest in assuring
that the schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing
discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate
their students. '219
4. Bullying Behavior and the Four Ws
Given the importance of an "orderly" and safe educational environ-
ment, the constant harassment of particular children by other children
should be controlled and stopped since such activity will not only dis-
rupt the educational process but also severely impact the children in-
volved.220 However, despite this disruption, many schools fail to
216. Id. at 204.
217. See LANE, supra note 124, at 10-12 for data and public opinion polls showing concern for
the safety of the schools.
218. See PAULA M. SHORT ET AL., RETHINKING STUDENT DISCIPLINE, ALTERNATIVES THAT
WORK (1994) (drawing on research and practice to present a practical step to new approaches in
discipline).
219. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
220. This disruption is usually most severe for the bully's victim. For example, many children
suffer from physical symptoms as a result of being picked on. See Katrina Williams et al., Associ-
ation of Common Health Symptoms with Bullying in Primary School Children, BRIT. MED. J.,
July 6, 1996, at 17 (concluding from their study of primary school children in a London school
district that frequent bullying behavior is associated with an increasing risk for the victim to
suffer from headaches, stomach aches, depression, bedwetting, and sleeping difficulties). An-
other disruption results when "target" children actually skip school to avoid bullying situations
at school. Id.; see Pamela Lister, Bullies: The Big New Problem You Must Know About,
REDBOOK, Nov. 1995, at 118 (citing a recent survey by Frank J. Barone, Ed.D., who "found that
58 percent of students had actually stayed home from school at least once because they were
[bullying] victims"). Often the bullying behavior of specific kids can impact how other children
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adequately monitor and discipline bullying behavior.221 Studies sug-
gest that school administrators and teachers severely underestimate
the pervasive nature of bullying.222 This failure to recognize and con-
trol bullying behavior can often stem from the general feeling that
bullying and teasing behavior is a normal experience of childhood. 223
This attitude has persisted for as long as the behavior has existed and
society, including educators, has failed to recognize bullying as a type
of destructive behavior warranting consistent surveillance.224 How-
ever, recent tragedies and new research have ushered in a heightened
awareness of bullying, as evident from the recent studies and litera-
ture on the subject.225 Such research and commentary on bullying and
the effects of such uncontrolled behavior has resulted in an explora-
tion of the issues behind this typical childhood experience.
a. Who is a bully? Who is a target?
Who is a bully? Bullies have been described as a "special breed of
children. ' 226 These children who engage in bullying have been shown
to perceive events differently than most children.227 This perception
has been described as "a hostile attributional bias, ' 228 which causes
perceive the safety of the school. Lister, supra, at 136 (noting the results of a "recent nationwide
survey of 65,000 sixth to twelfth graders [which found that] 43 percent of the public school stu-
dents said they avoid using school bathrooms").
221. See Lister, supra note 220, at 119 (noting that school administrators and teachers "seri-
ously underestimate the number of incidents" often because they fail to recognize bullying be-
havior and because some activities take place "out of their view-in hallways and bathrooms, on
playgrounds and school buses"). It has also been noted that some schools fail to "act on reports
of bullying for self serving reasons." Id. at 136. For example, some teachers do not want to
appear as though they cannot monitor and control their students. Id.
222. See HAZLER, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that "[r]esearch tells us that bullying is a much
larger problem than many adults, including professionals, realize").
223. See Hara E. Marano, Big.Bad.Bully., PSYCH. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 52 (discussing
American's slow realization of the harmful effects and consequences of bullying behavior); see
also HAZLER, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that although "bullying is common .. any implication
that bullying has little impact on individuals because it is normal is clearly false").
224. See HAZLER, supra note 1, at 15 (finding that "[t]he fact that everyone has experiences
with bullying may be a part of the reason that many people will see it as a normal aspect of life").
Hazier is optimistic that as research and programs dealing with bullying surface, the public, in
particular schools and parents, will more clearly understand and identify the problem. Id. at 17.
225. Id. at 15; see also OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 1; infra notes 379-84 and accompanying text
(describing the tragically fatal consequences of unchecked bullying).
226. See Marano, supra note 223, at 52 (stating that most children-sixty to seventy percent-
are never involved in chronic bullying behavior).
227. Id. at 54 (describing the inability to process social information as resulting in a child's
aggressive action).
228. Id. at 52.
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the child to attribute hostile intentions in innocent activity.229 Further
problems come from the bully's inability to perceive himself accu-
rately in his social situation.230 Child psychologist Melissa DeRosier,
Ph.D, of the University of North Carolina, finds that bullies are out of
touch with how little they are liked by their non-victim peers. 231 In
addition, she concludes that because of bullies' deficient social cogni-
tion they cannot "see the impact of their own behavior on others. '232
While bullies share many common traits, research indicates that
there are two distinct types of bullies.233 The classic bully, often
termed as "proactive" or "effectual," is aggressive and does not need a
stimulus to lead to a confrontation with his victim. 234 He 235 is moti-
vated by reward ("give me money") and is goal oriented.236 The other
type of bully, a "reactive bully" or "provocative victim," is someone
who is sometimes the aggressor and sometimes the target of someone
else's bullying.237  These bullies have been described as being the
worse off of the two types because they are motivated by perceived
provocation, anger easily, and usually "lose fights" because of high
levels of frustration and distress.238 These bullies have the fewest
friends, which increases the risks of the "external" perception
problems of classic bullies and the "internal" problems of depression
common to victims. 239
229. Id. (finding this type of paranoia to lead a bully to perceive such action as a dropped
book by another as a "call to arms").
230. Id. at 54 (describing this inability as social "blindness").
231. Id. (citing DeRosier as stating that because bullies are a threat to others, they are un-
likely to find out what other kids think of them). But see OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 35 (noting
that bullies may be popular with students, although this popularity tends to decrease in high
school). Professor Olweus further writes that "bullies do not seem to reach the low level of
popularity that characterizes victims." Id.
232. Marano, supra note 223, at 54.
233. Id. at 64 (suggesting that the differences between the two types sheds light on how the
bullying behavior takes shape).
234. Id. (terming these bullies as "classic playground bullies").
235. Id. at 70, 74. The pronoun "he" is used because studies show that although both boys and
girls bully, girls engage most frequently in relational aggression. This activity is unique to fe-
males and involves "damaging or manipulating their relationships in aversive ways." Id. See
generally Ann Douglas, When Push Comes to Shove, Girls Are Ready with Psychological Torture,
Cm. TRIB., Mar. 2, 1997, § 13 at 1, 6 (noting the psychological torture some girls employ on
others as a form of bullying).
236. Marano, supra note 223, at 64 (stating that these bullies often have friends-those who
are also bullies).
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing the findings of Professor David Perry, Ph.D., of Florida Atlantic University).
239. Id.
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The consistent victims, or targets, of bullying behavior also display a
specific set of psychological characteristics. 240 There are two types of
victims: the passive/submissive victim and the provocative victim. 241
The passive or submissive victim is described as "more sensitive, cau-
tious, and quiet than other kids ... and more anxious."242 The pro-
vocative victim, a much smaller group of victims, is characterized as a
combination of a passive victim with an aggressive reaction pattern.243
Victims, usually the submissive ones, often have close relationships
with their parents and are frequently raised in overprotective fami-
lies.244 This overprotection may prevent the victimized children from
developing skills to avoid future victimization.2 45
b. What Defines Bullying Behavior?
Bullying behavior involves three core elements: a pattern of behav-
ior between two children, based on "negative intent," where there is
an imbalance of power between the bully and his victim. 246 A unique
feature of bullying is the "chronicity" and the relationship that devel-
ops between a bully and his victim.2 47 The aggression of a bully can be
verbal, physical, or both, and studies show that as the bully gets older
the aggression gets more intense and often takes the form of verbal
threats.248
240. See id. at 54 (noting that studies indicate that eight to nine percent of all children are
constant targets of bullies).
241. See OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 32-33.
242. Marano, supra note 223, at 54 (stating that the victims often "set them[selves] up" for
victimization by freezing when faced with conflict); see OLWEus, supra note 1, at 32 ("[Plassive
victims signal to others that they are insecure and worthless individuals who will not retaliate if
they are attacked or insulted.").
243. OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 33. These children are described as "hyperactive" with behav-
ior that "provokes many students in the class, thus resulting in negative reactions from a large
part, or even the entire, class." Id.
244. Marano, supra note 223, at 56 (citing overprotection as the reason these kids never learn
to "handl[e] conflict").
245. Id.
246. Id. at 52 (stating that "[b]y definition, the bully's target has difficulty defending him-or
herself, and the bully's aggressive behavior is intended to cause distress"); see HAZLER, supra
note 1, at 6 (defining bullying as "repeatedly ... harming others ... by physical attack or by
hurting others' feelings through words, actions, or social exclusion ... where the bully is...
stronger than the victim"); OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 9 ("A student is being bullied or victimized
when he or she is exposed, repeatedly and over time, to negative actions on the part of one or
more other students .... ).
247. See HAZLER, supra note 1, at 3-19 (describing bullying as a "cycle of violence"); Marano,
supra note 210, at 52, 56 (describing the ongoing relationship between the bully and victim as a
"dance" of frequent interaction).
248. See Marano, supra note 223, at 52 (describing the verbal aggression as "name-calling,
taunts, threats, ridicule, and insults" and the physical aggression as "pushes and shoves and hit-
ting, kicking, and punching").
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c. Where Does This Behavior Begin and to Where Does It Lead?
The research shows that the roots of aggression point to the pre-
school years and continue through elementary and middle school.249
Most severe bullying is reported to occur around the time of pu-
berty.250 Most young bullies are up to par with the intellectual level of
their schoolmates, but as bullies mature, their aggressive behavior
often disrupts their intellectual skills.251 Unfortunately, this form of
behavior can continue into adulthood in the form of crime and domes-
tic violence.252
On the other hand, the children who are victims are usually submis-
sive before they are targeted.253 Psychologist David Schwartz studied
children's play groups and identified submissive children and the rea-
son they become targets for bullies.254 He found that when children
were submissive in nonconfrontational situations it made them easy
targets for future aggressive situations. 255 This behavior creates a
downward spiral: "[B]eing victimized leads to feeling bad .. .[and]
feeling anxious, which then increases vulnerability to further
victimization. 256
The results of victimization lead to an internal and external isola-
tion of the constantly targeted child.257 The victim internalizes much
of the teasing and taunting and as a result feels very lonely.258 This
withdrawal can lend itself to high achievement in academics where the
victim can retreat from his or her surroundings or, conversely, leads
the victim down the path of low motivation or self-esteem in all as-
pects of his or her life.259 The external isolation is a result of children
249. See id. at 54 (reporting that through elementary school, or grade six, bullies are of "aver-
age popularity," but as they get older, their popularity decreases). As bullies wind their way
through high school, "increasingly their behavior is acceptable only to others like themselves;
fortified with their hostile cognitive style and growing contempt for the values of others, they
spin their way to outcast lifestyle." Id. at 69.
250. See HAZLER, supra note 1, at 58 (reporting the "worst times" of bullying occur between
the sixth and ninth grades); Marano, supra note 223, at 54 (noting that most bullying occurs
between the ages of 8 and 16).
251. Marano, supra note 223, at 69.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 56.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 56 (noting that these children also suffer physical signs of consistent bullying
such as headaches and stomach pains); Williams, supra note 220, at 17 (concluding that many
victimized children suffer a variety of physical symptoms as a result of being bullied).
259. Marano, supra note 223, at 56 (finding that many of these children dislike school because
of the hostile environment).
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other than the bullies disassociating themselves from the victimized
child.260 Therefore, the victimized child usually has very few friends
and may suffer physically from severe bullying.261
d. Why Do Bullies Act the Way They Do?
Studies have also been conducted into how bullies become the way
they are. Most research points to circles of aggression or lack of mon-
itoring a child's behavior. 262 In fact, it has been noted that the "life of
aggression" is instilled in children by age two.263 Because children of
that age can only communicate through their actions or conduct, adult
intervention in aggression and development of language skills will
curb or stop such aggression.264 Children who receive adequate
caregiver interaction and instruction in earlier years tend to master
language skills and rely less on physical aggression to communicate. 265
Therefore, low language skill is an important key to deciphering why
bullies rely on aggression to communicate with others. 266
Of course, the child-parent role beyond the early years plays an im-
portant part in a bully's development. When a child frequently diso-
beys his or her parent, and such disobedience goes unpunished, the
child fails to recognize his noncompliance. 267 Because the child may
not recognize his wrongdoing, the child fails to understand why his
parents get upset and punish him for certain acts and not others.268
Inconsistent and, typically, physical punishment causes these children
to develop a mistrust of the world and reinforces their aggressive be-
260. Id. (highlighting the fact that this isolation is a severe form of stress and is very damaging
to the child's self image).
261. Id. (noting that the rejection by other children "deprives" the victims from social oppor-
tunities to build their self confidence).
262. Id. at 69; see Lister, supra note 220, at 119 (noting that children "grow up with less super-
vision than did previous generations"); see also Bullies See More of TV Violence, Less of Adults,
BROWN UNIVERSITY CHILD AND ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR LETER, Oct. 1996, at 6 [hereinafter
BEHAVIOR LETTER] (reporting that the results of a study indicated that middle school children
who engage in bullying behavior did not spend as much time with adults as their non-bullying
peers did). These children also were reported to have fewer adult role models. BEHAVIOR LET-
TER, supra.
263. Marano, supra note 223, at 70 (citing Richard E. Tremblay, Ph. D., who notes that physi-
cal aggression is normal at age two).
264. Id. (citing Tremblay who notes that once "[l]anguage skills increase,. .. physical aggres-
sion decreases").
265. Id.
266. Id. "In humans, even in beefy boys, social dominance has less and less to do with physi-
cal aggression-and more and more with language." Id.
267. Id. at 79 (noting that this disobedience usually involves trivial, daily matters such as fail-
ure to make the bed or wash hands before eating).
268. Id. (describing these events as a process which begins to control parents' behavior).
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havior towards others.269 Most parents fail to understand that when
they punish their child for his aggressive behavior with harsh punish-
ment, they only reinforce the circle of aggression.270
e. How Are Schools and Parents Responding?
As the research on bullying surfaces, the results indicate that
schools are not effectively responding to bullying behavior.2 71 Studies
also indicate that even parents are not responding to this problem,
usually because the parents are unaware of the situations. 272 Despite
these research results, more and more parents, teachers, and schools
have recognized this problem. Some of this recognition may have
been prompted by recent events that illustrate extreme severity of un-
controlled bullying.273 Some of the tragedies that have resulted from
bullying situations have "opened the eyes" of many parents, commu-
nities, and schools to the extensive harm children can cause one an-
other.274 The reaction to control this age-old problem has been
twofold: schools have become more active in monitoring and control-
ling bullying behavior 275 and in counseling both the bully and his vic-
tim through a variety of programs.276 An emphasis on family and
child participation has also been a focus of prevention and correc-
269. Id. at 82 (citing that these kids usually expect others to "treat them unfairly and
unpredictably").
270. Id. (noting parents' failure to reinforce prosocial behavior when their child does some-
thing good).
271. See HAZLER, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that "two out of three children report that
schools handle the problem of bullying poorly"). Hazier also found that many kids believed
their teachers did not know that bullying behavior was occurring in their classrooms. Id.; see also
OLwEus, supra note 1, at 20 (concluding from student questionnaire responses that students see
their teachers doing "relatively little to put a stop to bullying at school").
272. See OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 21.
273. See Marano, supra note 223, at 51. The author described the events concerning two boys
in their early teens who killed themselves due to severe teasing situations at school. Id.; see infra
notes 379-84 and accompanying text (discussing these events).
274. See 20/20: Teased, Taunted, and Bullied (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 28, 1995) [here-
inafter 20/20] (noting that this problem now receives more attention because of the increased
access children have to guns and the potential fatal consequences).
275. See Laura Wisniewski, Metro Schools Pursue Ways To Handle Bullies, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Apr. 10, 1994, at D8 (noting a Georgia school's approval of a specific student harass-
ment policy). This specific policy gives parents a vehicle to demand a bullying situation be ad-
dressed. It also gives the principal the discretion in punishment determinations. Id.
276. See Marano, supra note 223, at 53 (suggesting that parents enroll their children in a "so-
cial skills group"); see also Wisniewski, supra note 275 (noting the need for counseling for both
the victim and the bully in order to get to the roots of their problems); 20/20, supra note 274
(discussing a model program at a Florida elementary school where students use role playing to
build their self esteem in dealing with confrontational situations). See generally HAZLER, supra
note 1, at 65-206 (discussing his Promoting Issues in Common program as a "model for therapy"
for bullies and victims).
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tion.277 Overall, the consistent goal of most programs is for the chil-
dren to gain control over the situation and build their self-esteem,
rather than simply to punish the bullying child.
A variety of "programs" for schools, teachers, and parents to con-
trol bullying are becoming more available as research and awareness
increases. One such program, designed by Professor Dan Olweus, is a
scientifically evaluated intervention program that provides a variety of
measures at the school, class, and individual level.278 Professor
Olweus identifies the goal of the program as the reduction and, ide-
ally, the elimination of bullying problems on and off the school
yards.279 Professor Olweus has scientifically evaluated his program
through follow-up research on the schools and teachers using his pro-
gram.280 This research indicates that schools that use this program (or
certain aspects of it) have cut their bully-victim problems in half and
have reported an improved "social climate" in the classroom. 281 Pro-
fessor Olweus has also identified from this research that one of the
core elements necessary to the success of this intervention program is
the support from the principal or other school administrator and the
"awareness and involvement" of the teachers and parents.2 2
Although there are several advocated programs designed to control
bullying behavior, these programs can only survive with the support of
parents, teachers, school administrators, and ultimately the commu-
nity.28 3 Knowing the seriousness of bullying behavior and the lifelong
consequences it can have on its participants, what can "remedy" this
problem when the parents, teachers, and schools fail to address the
bullying problems in its own community? North Dakota recently
faced this issue when one of its communities allegedly failed to ad-
dress its bullying problems. This state's "legal solution" is the focus of
Part II and Part III.
277. See Marano, supra note 223, at 53, 55, 57 for tips on parent-child strategies to combat the
downward spiral and methods for facing the bully. Marano also notes methods of controlling
and helping the bully-child. Id. at 82. It is recommended that the parent break the circle of
aggression by consistently applying "nonhostile, nonthreatening, nonphysical sanctions" when
the child disobeys. Id.; see also Donna W. Lewis, Parents Can Help Kids Learn to Step in and
Halt Harassment, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 10, 1994, at D8 (discussing more suggestions on
how parents can help their children to deal with a bully).
278. OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 63-67.
279. Id. at 65.
280. Id. at 111-18.
281. Id. at 113-14.
282. Id. at 122-23.
283. Id.
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II. SUBJECT OPINION: SVEDBERG V. STAMNESS 2 8 4
A. Facts and Procedural History
This case arose from a persistent bullying situation which involved
two boys: The "bully" was in his mid-teens285 and his "target" was in
his early teen years286 when this dispute came to court. Anthony
Stamness had called Christian Svedberg "Dumbo" on many occasions,
making reference to Svedberg's ears and on one occasion stated,
"[y]ou had better watch it Dumbo or I will kill you. '287 One winter,
Stamness and others also constructed three large snow figures in their
small farming community.288 These snowmen had very large ears and
were understood by Svedberg and others to be representations of
himself.289 Svedberg became very frightened to attend school due to
Stamness' conduct.290 He also became very depressed and there were
reported suicidal comments. 291 Svedberg's parents spoke to school of-
ficials about the "Dumbo" name-calling incidents.292 There was no
reported action taken by the school, so Svedberg's parents sought the
issuance of a disorderly conduct restraining order.293
The district court determined that Stamness' threats against
Svedberg's physical safety, "incessant teasing," and harassment were
intended to affect adversely Svedberg's safety, security, and privacy. 294
As a result the district court ordered:
Anthony Stamness shall have no contact with Christian Svedberg
and shall cease or avoid the following specific conduct: Uninvited
visits to the Petitioner, harassing phone calls to the Petitioner, call-
ing the Petitioner abusive names (including "Dumbo"), or any other
conduct which injures the Petitioner, either physically or emotion-
ally, including the construction and public display of any effigy of
Christian Svedberg.295
284. 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994).
285. 525 N.W.2d at 685 (Levine, J., dissenting) (stating that Stamness was born August 27,
1977, making him seventeen years old at the time of this suit).
286. See 20/20, supra note 274 (stating that Svedberg was thirteen years old at the time of the
interview-which took place after the North Dakota Supreme Court rendered its decision).
287. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 680.
288. See 20/20, supra note 274 (noting that this incident took place in Northwood, North
Dakota).
289. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 680.
290. Id. at 679.
291. Id. at 684.
292. Id. at 685.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 680.
295. Id.
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The procedural history of this case involves Stamness' appeal of this
two-year disorderly conduct restraining order. The order was issued
under North Dakota's Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order stat-
ute,2 96 which enjoined "specific threatening, abusive, and assaultive
296. N.D. CErrr. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (Supp. 1995). The statute provides:
Disorderly conduct restraining order-Penalty.
1. "Disorderly conduct" means intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are
intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person. Disor-
derly conduct does not include constitutionally protected activity.
2. A person who is a victim of disorderly conduct or the parent or guardian of a minor
who is a victim of disorderly conduct may seek a disorderly conduct restraining order
from any court of competent jurisdiction in the manner provided in this section.
3. A petition for relief must allege facts sufficient to show the name of the alleged
victim, the name of the individual engaging in the disorderly conduct, and that the
individual engaged in the disorderly conduct. An affidavit made under oath stating the
specific facts and circumstances supporting the relief sought must accompany the
petition.
4. If the petition for relief alleges reasonable grounds to believe that an individual has
engaged in disorderly conduct, the court, pending a full hearing, may grant a temporary
disorderly conduct restraining order ordering the individual to cease or avoid the disor-
derly conduct or to have no contact with the person requesting the order. A temporary
restraining order may be entered only against the individual named in the petition. The
court may issue the temporary restraining order without giving notice to the respon-
dent. The temporary restraining order is in effect until a hearing is held on the issuance
of a restraining order under subsection 5.
5. The court may grant a disorderly conduct restraining order ordering the respondent
to cease or avoid the disorderly conduct or to have no contact with the applicant if:
a. A person files a petition under subsection 3;
b. The sheriff serves the respondent with a copy of the temporary restraining order
issued under subsection 4 and with notice of the time and place of the hearing;
c. The court sets a hearing for not later than fourteen days after issuance of the
temporary restraining order unless the time period is extended upon written consent of
the parties, or upon a showing that the respondent has not been served with a copy of
the temporary restraining order despite the exercise of due diligence; and
d. The court finds after the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the respondent has engaged in disorderly conduct. If a person claims to have been
engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of
the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity.
6. A restraining order may be issued only against the individual named in the petition.
Relief granted by the restraining order may not exceed a period of two years. The
restraining order may be served on the respondent by publication pursuant to rule 4 of
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.
7. A disorderly conduct restraining order must contain a conspicuous notice to the
respondent providing:
a. The specific conduct that constitutes a violation of the order;
b. Notice that violation of the restraining order is punishable by imprisonment of
up to one year or a fine of up to one thousand dollars or both; and
c. Notice that a peace officer may arrest the respondent without a warrant and take
the respondent into custody if the peace officer has probable cause to believe the re-
spondent has violated an order issued under this section.
8. If the respondent knows of an order issued under subsection 4 or 5, violation of the
order is a class A misdemeanor. If the existence of an order issued under subsection 3
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behaviors directed at Christian Svedberg. ' '297 Stamness appealed the
district court's finding of "reasonable grounds" to support the order
and the improper restraint the order placed on his First Amendment
rights.298 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's order.299 This opinion was filed in December 1994.300
B. Majority Opinion
The majority addressed both of Stamness' issues in its review and
attacked the first contention concerning reasonable grounds by re-
viewing the substance of the statute at issue.30 1 The statute allowed a
court to restrain conduct when it finds that "there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in disorderly con-
duct. ' 30 2 The majority, however, noted that the statute did not define
"reasonable grounds. '30 3 The absence of such a definition meant that
the court had to review state case law.3°4 The majority determined
that reasonable grounds existed for the purposes of the statute when
"facts and circumstances presented to the judge are sufficient to war-
rant a person of reasonable caution to believe that acts constituting
the offense of disorderly conduct have been committed. ' 30 5
The majority concluded that Stamness' contention of district court
error must fail based on review of the transcripts and the deference
given to the trial judge's expertise.306 In fact, the majority noted in a
footnote that the trial court actually required the petitioner to show
or 4 can be verified by a peace officer, the officer, without a warrant, may arrest and
take into custody an individual whom the peace officer has probable cause to believe
has violated the order.
9. The clerk of court shall transmit a copy of a restraining order by the close of the
business day on which the order was granted to the local law enforcement agency with
jurisdiction over the residence of the alleged victim of disorderly conduct. Each appro-
priate law enforcement agency may make available to its officers current information as
to the existence and status of any restraining order involving disorderly conduct.
10. Notwithstanding subsection 5 of section 11-16-05, a state's attorney may advise and
assist any person in the preparation of documents necessary to secure a restraining
order under this section.
Id.
297. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 679.
298. Id. at 680.
299. Id. at 679.
300. Id. at 678.
301. Id. at 681.
302. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01(4) (Supp. 1995)).
303. Id. at 681.
304. Id. (citing several cases that discussed "reasonable grounds" for DUI arrests).
305. Id. at 682.
306. Id.
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by a preponderance of evidence that the order should be issued, that
is, a "more stringent standard than contemplated by the statute. '30 7
The majority then turned to Stamness' second contention based on
a First Amendment argument.3 08 The statute included a "disclaimer"
that disorderly conduct does not include constitutionally protected ac-
tivity.309 Stamness sought to fit his speech and expression into that
loophole and gain immunity from the order.3 10
In response to Stamness' contention, the majority launched into a
discussion of the First Amendment and supporting the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. 31' It contended that although the First Amendment
usually prohibits the government from proscribing speech it dislikes,
not all speech is constitutionally protected. 31 2 The majority relied on
the categorization approach of the U.S. Supreme Court to evaluate
whether Stamness' expression qualified as "fighting words. '313
The majority applied the Chaplinsky incitement-to-violence test:
"To determine if an expression constitutes fighting words, we must ask
whether the expression if delivered to a reasonable and prudent per-
son of common intelligence, would cause the addressee immediately
to breach the peace. '314 The majority also determined that based on
the "elusive nature of fighting words" it should look at both the con-
tent and the context of the expression (including the age of the partici-
pants). 315 Under this approach, the majority found Stamness'
expression as a whole constituted fighting words and was, therefore,
unprotected by the First Amendment. The majority concluded that
there were sufficiently reasonable grounds to support the disorderly
conduct restraining order and that Stamness was not engaged in pro-
tected activity.316 It consequently affirmed the district court's
holding.317
307. Id. at 682 n.2.
308. Id. at 682.
309. Id. (quoting N.D. CEr. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01(1) (Supp. 1995)).
310. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 682 n.3. Stamness did not challenge the constitutionality of the
statute itself.
311. Id. at 682-84.
312. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992)); see supra notes 27-35, 61-65, 73-84 and accompanying text (discussing Chaplinsky, Co-
hen, and R.A.V.).
313. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 682.
314. Id. at 683 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 684.
317. Id.
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C. Concurring Opinion
The concurrence labeled Stamness' speech as something other than
fighting words to prohibit his expression. 318 The two concurring jus-
tices analyzed Stamness' expression as "threatening conduct" instead
of the majority's fighting words approach.319 The concurrence's anal-
ysis included an approach very similar approach to that of the major-
ity: "No precise words are necessary to convey a threat .... A threat
often takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it is spoken
and... in the context in which... [it is] recited. ' 320 The concurrence
found that Stamness' expression that accompanied or followed his
threatening conduct could not be constitutionally protected and there-
fore affirmed the district court decision.321
D. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Levine, found the major-
ity and the concurrence to be overstepping their bounds, intruding
into what should be a family and school matter. 322 Justice Levine
looked at the legislative history of the North Dakota stalking statute.
She highlighted that this statute was passed to address domestic vio-
lence and the need to control stalking.323 The statute was necessary to
allow courts to issue a civil restraining order to protect victims of
stalking, even if the victim did not suffer physical abuse by her
stalker.324 Justice Levine found proof in the legislative history and the
statutory language to support a legislative intent of the statute at issue
to "protect the victims of stalking and intimidation from conduct by
perpetrators which had put them in fear for their lives, their safety,
[and] their security. '' 325 Justice Levine found it necessary to filter the
facts of the case through both the words of the statute and the legisla-
tive history.326
The dissent also addressed the majority's First Amendment analy-
sis.327 Justice Levine looked at the evolution of the fighting words
doctrine and concluded that fighting words must be personally abusive
318. Id. at 684-85.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 687 (Levine, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 685-86; see also Minutes, supra note 113 (discussing legislative intent).
324. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 686 (Levine, J., dissenting).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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and likely to provoke a violent reaction.328 She reminded the majority
that the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul mandated a narrow interpretation of fighting words. 329 Although
Justice Levine acknowledged Stamness' infliction of pain and embar-
rassment on Svedberg, she did not agree that calling another
"Dumbo" and erecting three snowmen would be likely to cause an
objective person to immediately breach the peace.330 In fact, accord-
ing to Justice Levine's interpretation of fighting words jurisprudence,
Svedberg's pain was an irrelevant factor in the fighting words determi-
nation.331 The dissent questioned the appropriateness of the major-
ity's decision in light of other U.S. Supreme Court case law: "And, if
the first amendment protects 'virulent ethnic and religious epithets,'
... and threats to 'break your damn neck ... [if you go into racist
stores]', . . . how can it be possible that it does not protect saying
'Dumbo' and making snowmen?" 332
The dissent further disagreed with the concurrence that Stamness'
conduct was a threat of violence. 333 She pointed out that Stamness
did not engage in any physical conduct such as pushing, shoving, hit-
ting, or pinching.334 She furthermore found Stamness' statement that
he would kill Svedberg to be a "bluster" and not a true threat.335
Even so, Justice Levine indicated that she may have joined the major-
ity if the restraining order had been limited to prohibit further threats
of violence.336
Justice Levine also criticized the majority's treatment of the stalking
statute. She found that the majority's construction of the statute's ap-
plication turned it into an "overbroad, unconstitutional statute, at
least as applied. '337 She warned her fellow justices that the U.S.
Supreme Court looks to a state supreme court's construction of a stat-
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 687. Justice Levine agreed with the majority that it is important to look at the
context of a situation to determine whether speech constitutes fighting words. Id. at 686. How-
ever, Justice Levine did not agree that "given the context of this case, that erecting three
snowmen with big ears and calling someone 'Dumbo' can be constitutionally prohibited by a
court." Id.
331. Id. at 686.
332. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting respectively United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902
(1982)).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 687.
335. Id. The court found that Stamness may have been "an insensitive, teenage clod" but that
his conduct was "[niot the stuff violence is made of." Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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ute to determine whether a challenged statute passes constitutional
muster. She wrote that there is a great need for this statute and hopes
future application will be within the confines of the Constitution.338
The dissent concluded that this case belonged back in the school
where parents and school authorities have extensive power to control
their children. 339 She contended that the majority's approach allows
the court to "step into the breach" of the school's and parent's respon-
sibility, rather than encouraging the community to resolve "'ordinary
problems of daily living.'"340
E. Subsequent Legislative Response
Several months after the Svedberg decision was issued, the North
Dakota legislature amended the Disorderly Conduct Restraining Or-
der statute and included language from this decision in its notes. 341
The only change the legislature made to the statute was a procedural
change to subsection (4).342 Subsection (4) of the 1995 supplement
limited the effectiveness of the temporary restraining order to thirty
days.343
The legislature also added subsection 11 to the 1995 supplement. 344
This subsection provided that no fees may be charged to petitioner in
any proceedings seeking relief due to domestic violence. 345
The legislative notes included in this supplement represent the leg-
islature's adherence to the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion and application of the 1993 statute in Svedberg:
Taunts, threats, including a threat to kill, and the public display of
snow effigies which were constructed to harass victim, when deliv-
ered to a 14-year-old, were sufficient when taken as a whole to con-
stitute fighting words, and were therefore unprotected by the First
Amendment.... To determine what constitutes fighting words, a
court must consider both the content and the context of the expres-
sion, including the age of the participants. 346
338. Id. (finding the majority's treatment of the Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order statute
"distressing").
339. Id.
340. Id. (citation omitted).
341. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (Supp. 1995).
342. Id. § 12.1-31.2-01(4). This subsection, in the 1993 statute, stated that the effective time of
a temporary restraining order was until a hearing was held on the issuance of a restraining order
under subsection 5.
343. Id.
344. Id. § 12.1-31.2-01(11) (stating that "[f]ees for filing and service of process may not be
charge to the petitioner in any proceeding seeking relief due to domestic violence under this
chapter").
345. Id.
346. Id. (citations omitted).
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III. ANALYSIS
On the surface, it is understandable why the North Dakota
Supreme Court felt compelled to render "relief" in this situation.
Both the school administrators and the community (including Stam-
ness' parents) failed to recognize and remedy the pain one child was
imposing on another. 347 The court did not, however, serve justice with
its decision. The court provided no standards for lower courts to eval-
uate the application of this "remedy" for future bullying cases. An
analysis of the court's fighting words approach exposes the limitless
boundaries the court has created for the future application of the Dis-
orderly Conduct Restraining Order statute to children. This section
of the Note further explores this situation as resolved under public
school law, thereby suggesting the appropriate forum for most bully-
victim resolutions.
A. Inappropriate Forum for Remedy
Although the Svedberg majority and concurrence had proper inten-
tions, its faulty and ambiguous fighting words reasoning elicited an
inadequate result. The North Dakota Supreme Court majority identi-
fied the relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent in its general fighting
words discussion.348 It reviewed the applicable rules and noted
R.A.V.'s recognition of the continued vitality of the doctrine.349 In
fact, the majority correctly defined the current fighting words test
used to determine what expression is protected and what is not: "To
determine if an expression constitutes fighting words, we must ask
whether the expression, if delivered to a reasonable and prudent per-
son . . .. would cause the addressee immediately to breach the
peace. '' 350 Despite this correct identification, the majority simply does
not apply the law properly to the facts of the case.
The majority's fighting words analysis hinged on the context of the
boy's expression. In other words, the majority focused on the ages
and the circumstances surrounding the encounters to justify its hold-
ing.351 The majority used a great deal of ink to defend its reliance on
the "context" of the speech (the age of the participants). The consid-
347. Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 685 (N.D. 1994) (noting that even though the
victim's parents approached the school board for assistance in resolving the matter, they were
denied such relief).
348. Id. at 682-84.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 683 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
351. Id. at 683-84 (discussing case law supporting the majority's position). The majority em-
phasized that the "only workable definition [of fighting words] must necessarily be contextual."
Id. at 683.
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eration of the participants' ages was not erroneous. In fact, the North
Dakota Supreme Court previously advocated looking into the context
of the situation when making a fighting words determination in its
1991 Schoppert decision. 352 The concurring and dissenting opinions in
Svedberg also supported the consideration of the context of the
speech.353 However, despite this undisputed look into the context of
the speech, the majority utterly failed to apply the context of the boy's
expression to the fighting words test.354 Thus, after the majority re-
solved that it would consider the ages of Svedberg and Stamness in
the fighting words determination, it concluded, without applying the
test, that Stamness' expression constituted fighting words. 355 The lim-
ited analysis the majority did perform was in the concluding sentences
of its opinion.356 The majority determined that Stamness' expression,
described as "taunts, threats ... , and public display of snow effigies,
... as a whole constituted fighting words. '357 The majority failed to
apply the fighting words test, focusing exclusively on the content of
the expression, rather than on the response of the addressee. 358
In order to determine whether the taunts, threats, and snowmen
were fighting words, the majority needed to analyze the following
question: Would Stamness' expression, when delivered to a reason-
able thirteen-year-old individual, cause this individual immediately to
breach the peace? 359 The articulation of the proper question reveals
why the majority avoided posing it: A reasonable, thirteen-year-old
boy would not be likely to fight back in response to the taunts of a
seventeen-year-old boy, especially if that thirteen-year-old boy had
been the target of such taunts for years. 360 Although the fighting
352. City of Bismark v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 812 (N.D. 1991).
353. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 684-87.
354. Id. at 684 (holding that Stamness' expression constituted fighting words). Although the
majority determined that the correct test evaluates the reaction of a reasonable thirteen-year-
old, it failed to apply it.
355. Id. at 683. The majority based its fighting words determination on the fact that the ex-
pression at issue was between children, not that the expression was likely to cause a violent
response. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. In fact, North Dakota had previously recognized the importance of looking at the reac-
tion of the addressee in its Schoppert decision. See City of Bismark v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d
808, 813 (N.D. 1991). In Schoppert, the court determined the defendant's "words were not a
clear invitation to fight," thus failing the fighting words test. Id.; see also Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding a conviction based on the audience's reaction to a speech, not the
words spoken alone).
359. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 683. This question was constructed from the majority's identifi-
cation of the relevant test.
360. See Marano, supra note 223, at 54 (discussing the unlikelihood of a victim child of bully-
ing to respond physically to his bully aggressor).
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words test fails to consider the unlikelihood of such a response, the
majority should have, at the very least, articulated a rationale for still
classifying this expression as fighting words. 361
By refusing to address the obvious failure of the test or give other
support for its conclusion, the majority leaves future courts with a
conclusory, per se test. This approach focuses on the ages and circum-
stances of the participants and permits the court to presume fighting
words solely based on the fact that the court is dealing with expression
between children. This gives the lower courts little direction since it
appears that these courts could render most "teasing" dialogue be-
tween children as fighting words. Once these courts find that a child's
words are not protected expression (that it constitutes fighting words),
this "teasing" expression will undoubtedly fall within the definition of
"disorderly conduct" under the current stalking law. 362 The majority's
open-ended approach has dire future implications on how North Da-
kota will handle confrontational child dialogue, as further addressed
in Part IV.
The concurrence in Svedberg agreed with the majority that Stam-
ness' expression should not receive immunity, although it implicitly
recognized the shortcomings of the fighting words approach by taking
an alternative argument. The concurring justices chose to "hang their
hat" on Stamness' threat to Svedberg as falling outside the First
Amendment protections. As a general principle, threats of violence
should not be protected, but as the dissenting justice points out, it is
also important to look at the threat in the context of the situation. 363
Although there should be no excuse for one child threatening the life
of another, the context of the threat does not support bootstrapping
all of Stamness' expression to one careless comment. 364 If the concur-
rence, and majority, were so concerned with the threat, it could have,
361. For example the majority could have asserted a lower constitutional protection for Stam-
ness' expression based on Stamness' status as a child. See MOSHMAN, supra note 124, at 6 (rec-
ognizing that children possess modified constitutional rights). Furthermore, some scholars
contend that the fighting words standard as a whole should rely less on the response of the
addressee and take into account the situation of the victims. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note
10, at 53 ("[The] inquiry should not concentrate on the perceived capacity of a particular victim
to respond physically. The test should be whether remarks of that sort in that context would
cause many listeners to respond forcibly."). Id.
362. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (Supp. 1995). The statute covers "intrusive or unwanted
acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of
another person." Id. It is therefore likely that unprotected teasing expression would be disor-
derly conduct under North Dakota's stalking statute.
363. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 687 (Levine, J., dissenting).
364. Id. The dissenting justice had "difficulty taking serious the utterance of an insensitive,
teenage clod." Id.
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as the dissent suggested, limited the restraining order to further
threats of violence. 365
Besides pointing to some of the shortcomings in the approaches of
the majority and concurrence, the dissenting justice in Svedberg cor-
rectly identified where this case belonged: back in the community and
out of the courts.366 The dissenting justice scolded the school adminis-
trators and parents in this situation for failing to resolve this situation
in their community. Unlike the majority or concurrence, the dissent-
ing justice looked beyond the individual case to the implications of
future parents and children resolving these situations through the law.
In addition to the inappropriateness of the court's role in curtailing
a verbal bullying situation, the utilization of the Disorderly Conduct
Restraining Order statute, which supplements the anti-stalking stat-
ute,367 as a vehicle into court may threaten to stretch the statute's con-
tours to unconstitutional boundaries.368 The events that prompted
states to enact anti-stalking legislation suggest that such laws were in-
tended to protect women who were being watched, followed,
harassed, and abused by estranged husbands, boyfriends, and even
strangers.369 It is certainly possible that a child may engage in "stalk-
ing" behavior and the stalking law could cover those situations where
schools and parents are unable to control adequately intrusive activity
that threatens the safety of another child. However, it is inappropri-
ate to use stalking laws to control verbal bullying situations between
children because, unlike most stalking victims whose only protection
365. Id.
366. Id. Justice Levine, the dissenting justice, also expressed concern with the application of
this statute in the stalking context as applied to bullying situations. Her concern goes back to the
majority's limitless application of the statute and its failure to put any restraints on lower courts
in future application to the bullying context. Id.
367. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history indicat-
ing the supplemental nature of the Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order statute to the anti-
stalking statute).
368. The dissent in Svedberg attacked the majority's broad construction of "disorderly con-
duct" within the meaning of the supplemental anti-stalking law. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 687
(Levine, J., dissenting). The dissent noted the majority's construction "turn[ed] [the Disorderly
Conduct Restraining Order statute] into an overbroad, unconstitutional statute ... as applied."
Id.
369. See supra note 116. California, the first state to enact an anti-stalking law, passed its
legislation in response to the murders of women who were stalked by men from previous rela-
tionships or strangers. See Sneirson, supra note 116, at 652. The dissent in Svedberg noted that
the Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order statute used to prohibit Svedberg's expression was
"passed in response to the growing community awareness of domestic violence and the need to
control stalking." Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 685 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the dissent
believed that this statute was designed to supplement the anti-stalking law and restrain "fre-
quently employed tactics of intimidation by stalking, engaged in by expartners of broken relation-
ships." Id. (emphasis added).
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is under the law, the victimized child can seek shelter in more effective
fora than the courts: the school and home environment.
B. Proper Forum Advocated
Stamness' expression could have been prohibited more effectively
within the confines of the school environment. Had the North Dakota
Supreme Court forced the resolution back to the community level, the
school system could have more appropriately and effectively prohib-
ited Stamness' expression. Under public school law precedent, Stam-
ness' expression would have been deemed a disruption to the
"operation of the school. '370 This disruption was obvious in
Svedberg's physical and emotional condition as a result of this teasing
and it likely impacted the school environment for other children
(either those who witnessed or those who participated in the teasing).
Furthermore, even under Moshman's theory, Stamness was proba-
bly less rational than an adult and generally unable to conceptualize
moral issues.371 Moshman's evaluation of studies on children's psy-
chological development indicates that many teenagers reach an adult
level of rational thinking and as a result should have similar First
Amendment protections due to the teen's ability to comprehend the
effects of speech and expression. 372 However, even though Stamness
had reached his teen years at the time of this incident, Moshman
would certainly agree that Stamness' behavior and total disregard for
another student's obvious pain and embarrassment is evidence that
Stamness was not rationalizing as an adult. Moshman would also con-
clude that disruptive speech in school should be curtailed to avoid
harm to other children. 373 Thus, even the theory Moshman advocates
points to active school discipline to curtail Stamness' disruptive ex-
pression directed at Svedberg due to the harm it caused Svedberg and
370. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). School
authorities could have also controlled Stamness' "off-school" expression since it had a detrimen-
tal impact on Svedberg's well-being. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing
the latitude schools have in punishing children for activities occurring off school premises). Even
Moshman would recognize the need for discipline and control in the case note situation. See
supra notes 182-83, 199 and accompanying text. The bully's maturity level was clearly less than
expected for his age.
371. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing Moshman's theory that chil-
dren show signs of emerging rationality and may, by early teenage years, have the same ability to
rationalize as an adult). According to Moshman, a child's ability to rationalize provides justifica-
tion for full First Amendment protections. MOSHMAN, supra note 124, at 90-91.
372. MOSRMAN, supra note 124, at 90-91. Moshman notes that courts often rely on the myth
that children are "inherently irrational" to justify restriction on their liberty. Id. at 91.
373. See id. at 89-91.
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the school environment and the participant's inability to rationalize as
an adult.
It may be argued that because the school could properly curtail
Stamness' expression under public school law precedent, there is no
harm when a court steps into the school's role and accomplishes the
"same" result through legal means instead of school discipline. This
argument is necessarily premised on the idea that the court could
achieve the same, or even similar, results through a restraining order
as the schools could through discipline and treatment. This simply is
not the case. The judicial system is neither equipped to continually
monitor these situations between children nor is it capable of moving
beyond the quick-fix remedy to treat the problem. Thus, such an ar-
gument that equalizes the roles of the schools and courts in bullying
situations fails due to the unequal capabilities to truly remedy the
problem.
In addition to the unequal remedies, the school's role in disciplining
children in public schools was explicitly outlined in Tinker as not only
a right, but a duty to guarantee the proper operation of the educa-
tional process.374 Thus, the court's assumption of that role deprives a
school of its essential function of molding the discipline to fit the cir-
cumstances of the incident and the children involved.
Not only could the schools accomplish the same result as the court
did, the overall result would have been more effective, rendering both
Svedberg and Stamness a more peaceful resolution. The court quite
clearly cannot do what a school, parents, and a community can do,
that is, address the problems at the root, going beyond mere disci-
pline.375 Despite the courts' inability to fully address these problems,
this author recognizes that the Svedberg court's artificial means may
have been the only solution in this case where the other avenues for
relief failed.376 Although the record is not clear on the exact steps
Svedberg's parents took to remedy the bullying, there is evidence that
the parents talked to the school board in attempts to stop this behav-
374. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. The Court emphasized the authority of school officials to control
and regulate the operations of the school. Id.
375. See Marano, supra note 223, at 53, 55, 57 (suggesting a more comprehensive approach to
the psychological issues).
376. Although the author disagrees with the court's fighting words analysis and the general
inappropriateness of using the stalking law to remedy a bully situation, she acknowledges the
improbability that this particular community (particularly Stamness' parents) would have recti-
fied the situation absent the restraining order. The school administrators, however, may have
been more effective in curtailing this behavior if the court had ordered it to address the matter.
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ior.377 Therefore, the court should have limited the statute's applica-
bility to cases where the victim and his or her parents have exhausted
their remedies in the school and community. Although the court in
Svedberg most certainly had good intentions, its open-ended opinion
raises concerns about the future impact it may have on how North
Dakota, and possibly other states, will handle childhood
confrontations.
IV. IMPACT
As mentioned, what may be even more troubling than the major-
ity's fighting words analysis was its complete failure to limit the future
application of the statute. This section previews the potential impact
this decision may have on the future resolution of childhood disputes.
Before the impact of North Dakota's approach is explored, it is neces-
sary to recognize the tragic consequences that can result from a bully-
ing situation.
A. Bullying Behavior Is Not "Child's Play": Tragic Consequences
What happens to a child who is tormented, teased, ridiculed, and
basically socially ostracized by his peers? Some children may only be
picked on once or twice a year or even once or twice in their child-
hood. These children are usually able to cope with the few incidents
because they learn to handle confrontational situations and typically
have good self-images to combat the spiral of intimidation.
Then there are the other children, the eight or nine percent of all
children teased, who are the constant target for bullying and aggres-
sive behavior.378 What happens to them? Hopefully, these children
do not sink into their own despair like eighth-grader Curtis Taylor
377. Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 685 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J., dissenting) (noting
that this case was "a sad tale of parents who failed to parent and school administrators who
failed to administer"). The dissent noted that Svedberg's parents talked to school board mem-
bers about the name calling "but to no avail." Id. Neither the majority nor the concurring
opinion mentioned this failure of the school to curb this behavior. Id. at 678-85. A later report
indicated that prior to turning to the stalking law, the Svedberg's had filed charges against some
of the bullies harassing their son. Lister, supra note 220, at 119. This report quotes Darlene
Svedberg, the victim's mother, regarding the measures they took to stop the bullying behavior by
several different boys: "'Although we asked the school to put an end to the bullying and we
reported the bicycle thefts to the police, those boys were never really disciplined."' Id. It is
further reported that Mrs. Svedberg believed that the "community encourage[d] teasing." Id.
The superintendent of this community's public schools said that he took "appropriate action in
response to the Svedbergs' complaints." Id.
378. Marano, supra note 223, at 54. Most of these children who are constant targets are be-
tween the ages of 8 and 16. Id.
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did.379 In 1993, after years of tormenting physical and verbal aggres-
sion from classmates, Curtis took his own life in his family home.380
The day of his suicide was reported to be an especially harassing day
where boys poured milk down Curtis' shirt in front of his
classmates. 381
Several months later, the nation was shocked again by the suicide of
fifteen-year-old Brian Head in Georgia. 382 Brian was teased for years
and suffered deep depression.383 One day at school, Brian walked to
the middle of his classroom, screamed that he could not take it any-
more, and shot himself in the head before his horrified classmates. 38 4
The seriousness of bullying behavior is illustrated in these fatal con-
sequences that strike communities every year. In fact, it is often inci-
dents like these that wake up communities and schools to implement
more effective approaches to control these situations.385 Unfortu-
nately, for Curtis and Brian, this help came too late. These events
illustrate the seriousness of this behavior and the real need for help
for both the victim and his aggressor.
B. A Court-Ordered Solution To Control Bullying Fails the
Children Involved
A trend toward a law-based remedy to stop bullying would only
circumvent the problems that fester below the surface of aggressive
and submissive behavior. The court's decision in Svedberg may have
rendered a remedy for one child, but its standardless approach leaves
North Dakota on the edge of a tempting trend. By not defining the
boundaries of its decision, the court may have invited parents and
schools to allow the law to take over the control of their children. The
court should have limited the application of this remedy to cases
where there is a complete failure in the homes, school, and community
to curtail effectively the bullying problem. The appeal of the re-
straining order is its seemingly "tough" approach. After all, a $1,000
379. Id. at 51.
380. Id. Marano describes the abuse Curtis experienced at his middle school in Burlington,
Iowa: "For three years other boys had been tripping him . . ., knocking things out of his
hands.... [and had] taken his head ... and banged it into a locker.... His bicycle was vandal-
ized twice. Kids even kicked the cast that covered his broken ankle." Id.
381. Id. Immediately after that incident, Curtis went to see a school counselor and reportedly
"blamed himself for the other kids not liking him." Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. See Lewis, supra note 277 (describing one school's reaction to the suicide of Brian Head).
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fine and up to one year in jail is a much tougher sentence for "break-
ing the rules" than a suspension or no recess.386
In addition to the court's role, the North Dakota legislature's quick
action to approve of such a remedy is evident by its adoption of some
of the majority's language in the legislative notes following an amend-
ment to the statute.387 This act by the legislature puts the state's
stamp of approval on such actions by parents, letting them know that
the state will assume the role of a child's disciplinary figure. In other
words, by adopting the majority's language from the opinion, the leg-
islature is implicitly recognizing its Disorderly Conduct Restraining
Order statute as an appropriate solution to remedy all bullying situa-
tions, regardless of the efforts of the schools and parents to stop the
behavior.
The fundamental problem with using the law to stop a bullying situ-
ation is that it only deals with the remedy, not the cure. Both the
bully and the victim need to get beyond the underlying issues that
result in the circle of aggressive or submissive behavior.
For example, the bullying child needs to learn to deal with his ag-
gression.388 He or she also needs to be taught to "feel empathy to-
ward the victim. '389 If not treated, it will only be a matter of time
before the bully finds a new target or a new source for his aggression.
These children can grow up into aggressive adults-which can lead to
crime and domestic violence. 390 Professor Olweus has documented
school bullies' tendencies towards crime and violence as adults. 39 1 His
studies showed that sixty percent of boys who displayed bullying be-
havior in the sixth through ninth grades had at least one conviction by
their twenty-fourth birthday. 392 Even more disturbing, over one-third
of the bullies had three or more convictions by this age.393 Professor
Olweus concluded that "as young adults, the former school bullies had
a fourfold increase in the level of relatively serious, recidivist criminal-
386. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01(7)(b) (Supp. 1995) (delineating the penalties for violat-
ing the restraining order).
387. Id.
388. See Marano, supra note 223, at 82.
389. Douglas, supra note 235, at 6.
390. See Marano, supra note 223, at 82; see also HAZLER, supra note 1, at 34 ("Those who
remain chronic bullies during school age are much more likely to have a variety of violence and
crime-related problems as adults .....
391. OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 36.
392. Id.
393. Id. Professor Olweus further noted that only ten percent of the boys who were neither
characterized as bullies or victims in grades six through nine had three or more convictions by
age twenty-four. Id. Former victims were described to have average or below-average level of
criminality by their mid-twenties. Id.
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ity."'394 Thus, those children who do not learn how to deal with their
aggression are likely to have troubled adult lives.
Similarly, the victims also need to learn skills to improve their self-
image and to gain control over their environment in order to grow
into healthy adults. 395 Most severely teased and tortured children suf-
fer from depression and have dangerously low levels of self-esteem. 396
Not only does the victimized child need counseling, but he also needs
to develop the self-confidence to face future confrontational situa-
tions.397 The law cannot be there for the child in every situation, but
self-esteem will.
In fact, the real tragedy in the Svedberg case further illustrates the
law's inability to truly remedy the situation. After the court awarded
the restraining order, the Svedberg family felt forced to move from
their town based on the negative reaction both the parents and their
child received from their community. 398 Such a result is a sad com-
mentary on the lack of support the school and community gave this
family to correct abusive behavior between children.
CONCLUSION
There is no easy answer as to how the case at issue should have
been decided. The court was not wrong for providing a remedy where
the school and community allegedly failed in its responsibility to pro-
tect its children. Beyond the majority's failure to apply correctly the
fighting words doctrine, the court's error may have really been in its
shortsightedness to the potential "trend" that may result from its
open-ended decision. The Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order
statute and the other anti-stalking law should only be applied to those
situations where the parents, school, and community have failed to
address or stop persistent harassment of specific children. Because
the North Dakota Supreme Court and the legislature failed to limit
394. Id.
395. Former bullied victims may feel the pain of their victimization into adulthood. See
HAZLER, supra note 1, at xii-xvii (sharing the story of Tom Brown, titled You Never Really Get
Over It); Douglas, supra note 235, at 1, 6 (noting the pain and anger a woman in her thirties
carries with her to this day from severe teasing from her school years).
396. See Marano, supra note 223, at 82.
397. See Douglas, supra note 235, at 6 (noting that "[t]he victim needs to be taught how to
practice assertive behavior: how to use posture, eye contact, voice and other techniques to con-
vey strength").
398. Lister, supra note 220, at 116, 138 (noting that the family "won the battle but lost the
war" when the Svedbergs felt forced to move to a different town even after the restraining order
was upheld by the supreme court); see 20/20, supra note 274.
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the statute's applicability, it is vital for parents, schools, and communi-
ties to resist any temptation to use the law as its first source of relief.
Such an old-fashioned problem deserves the old-fashioned remedy:
Society must control this behavior in the homes, schools, and commu-
nities where it can be cured. Parents and the schools should remain
the guardians of children to prevent the bullying and aggressive con-
duct. Although aggressive expression is particularly tough to monitor
and control based on its often secret and nonphysical nature, it is
clearly better controlled in the schools and homes rather than in the
courts. The Svedberg v. Stamness case demonstrates the difficulty, if
not impossibility, to construct a workable and effective fighting words
approach to bullying situations. Therefore, keeping bullying cases in
the school where they belong is essential to effective resolutions of
these problems. It is the only way to ensure that both the victim and
his or her bully get the psychological help needed to untangle the web
of inner doubt and destruction.
There is an issue of bullying that goes beyond the words, the
wounds, and the pain involved in this childhood phenomenon. Profes-
sor Olweus labels this issue as involving "fundamental democratic
principles":
Every individual should have the right to be spared oppression
and repeated, intentional humiliation, in school and society at large.
No student should have to be afraid of going to school for fear of
being harassed or degraded, and no parent should need to worry
about such things happening to his or her child! 399
As guarantors of such rights, schools and communities must work
together to grant every child in their care that right to learn and grow
in a safe environment.
Colleen Creamer Fielkow
399. OLWEUS, supra note 1, at 48.
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